“For bird lime as much as is sufficient to put on a lime twig.” There is a Boraitha: As much as is sufficient to put on a twig for the purpose of catching birds.

“For pitch and sulphur,” etc. A Boraitha states: Sufficient to fill up a hole in a quicksilver tube.

“For loam,” etc. A Boraitha states: Sufficient to fill up the cracks in a small stove.

“For clay,” etc. The rabbis taught: It is prohibited to carry out hair for the purpose of mixing it with clay used to cover a goldsmith’s bellows-pipe with.

“For lime,” etc. A Boraitha states: To cover the smallest finger of a damsel. Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh: Daughters of Israel, when they become of age, and they have not yet developed the signs of puberty, the poor smear their bodies with lime, the rich ones with fine meal, and princesses with myrrh oil. What is myrrh oil? στακτη. And R. Jeremiah b. Aba said: Olive oil from olives which were only one third ripe. There is a Boraitha: R. Jehudah said: It is called (in Menachoth) anphiknun (ομφανιον); and why do they anoint with this? Because it removes the hair and makes the complexion clear. R. Bibi had such a daughter and he anointed her with the same, each member of her body separately; and finally one of the prominent men paid him four hundred zuz and married her. He had a Gentile neighbor who also had such a daughter, and he anointed her whole body at one time, and she died; said he: “R. Bibi has murdered my daughter.” Said R. Na’hman: “R. Bibi, who used to drink beer, his daughter needed the anointing, but our daughters do not need it, for we do not drink beer.”

“As much as is sufficient to cover,” etc. What is meant by Kalkub and Andiphi? Said Rabh: The temple, and the hair between it and the ear. Are we to understand from the Mishna that the prescribed quantity permitted by R. Jehudah is larger than that of the rabbis? Is it not a fact that the rabbis allow the larger prescribed quantity? Aye; R. Jehudah allows a larger quantity than R. Nehemiah, but still a smaller quantity than the rabbis. Or it is possible that an Andiphi means a forehead, from the following narration: “It happened that a Galilean once came to Babylon and was requested to lecture on metaphysics. The Galilean consented and began: I will interpret to you something in the style of R. Nehemiah. Meanwhile a wasp flew out of the wall, stung him on the Andiphi (forehead) and the Galilean died on the spot. It was said that he died a merited death.”

MISHNA III.: For sealing-wax the prescribed quantity is as much as is required for the sealing of a bale of goods, so is the decree of R. Aqiba; the sages, however, say for the sealing of a letter. For dung or fine sand as much as is required to fertilize (the soil around) a cabbage stalk, according to R. Aqiba, and to the sages as much as is required to fertilize (the soil around) a leek stalk. For coarse sand as much as is required to fill a trowel, for reed as much as is required to make a writing-pen from, or should it be thick or split, as much as is required to fry the softest beaten egg with, (which) mixed with oil, (lies) in a hot shell.

GEMARA: “Sufficient to fill a trowel.” A Boraitha states: (For coarse sand the prescribed quantity is) as much as is required to fill the trowel of a plasterer. Who is the Tana that holds that sand is an improvement on plaster? Said R. Hisda: R. Jehudah of a Boraitha (Baba Bathra, 60b); Rabha, however, said it may be also in accordance with the rabbis, as they hold that the spoiling (of the whiteness) of the plaster (through the admixture of sand) is an improvement of its durability.

“For reed as much as is required to make a writing-pen.” A Boraitha teaches: A pen that reaches the joints of the fingers.

“Or should it be thick.” A Boraitha teaches: To fry a beaten egg mixed with oil. Said Mar b. Rabhina to his son: “Didst thou ever hear what is understood by the softest egg?” He answered that R. Shesheth said it was a hen’s egg, Why does the Mishna call it a light (soft) egg? Because the sages found that no eggs are cooked as quickly as pullets’ eggs. Why is it that all other prescribed quantities prohibited to be carried out on the Sabbath are of the size of a dried fig, and here the quantity is of the size of an egg? Answered R. Na’hman: “Even here is meant the quantity of a dried fig from an egg.”

MISHNA IV.: The quantity of a bone is that large enough to be made into a spoon — R. Jehudah says large enough to be made into a key; glass of sufficient size to be used for scraping off the points of a weaver’s spindles; a splinter or a stone large enough to throw at a bird — R. Elazar b. Jacob says to throw at an animal.

GEMARA: Is it to be understood from the Mishna that the prescribed quantity allowed by R. Jehudah is larger than that allowed by the rabbis? Is it not a fact that the rabbis allow the larger? Said Ulla: (R. Jehudah refers to) the tooth of a key.

“Glass of sufficient size,” etc. A Boraitha states: Sufficient glass to cut two threads at once.

“A splinter,” etc. Said R. in the name of R. Johanan: “Provided it is large enough to hurt.” But how large should it be? R. Elazar b. Jacob teaches in a Boraitha: The weight of ten zuz.

Zunin once entered the college and questioned the teachers. “What is the prescribed quantity for gravel used in privy for toilet purposes?” He was answered: “The equivalent in quantity to the size of an olive, a nut, or an egg.” Said he: “It would then be necessary to carry along a scale.” So they deliberated, and decided that the quantity should be a handful.

Rabba b. R. Shilla asked of R. Hisda: “Is it permitted to carry up gravel to the roof (for the purpose cited above, as it is extra trouble, which is prohibited on the Sabbath)?” He answered: “Precious is the honor of man. For honor’s sake, even a direct scriptural commandment may be circumvened!”

Said R. Johanan: It is forbidden to use fragments of earthenware for toilet purposes (after doing one’s necessities) on the Sabbath. What is the reason? Is it to say because it is dangerous, then it should be forbidden also on week days; or is it to say because of witchcraft, it would also be prohibited on week days? What then is the reason? Is it because it may remove the hair (from the posterior)? Would this not be an act performed without intention (and work done unintentionally, he is of the opinion is permissible)? R. Nathan b. Ashia answered: A great man made the assertion; we have to find, therefore, a reason for it. There is no doubt whatever that fragments of earthenware are prohibited to be used on week days, when some other things can easily be obtained; but on Sabbath, if nothing else happens to be on hand, nor may be bought, the fragments might be considered as utensils; and, lest one might be inclined to think that for this reason they would be permitted to be used, he informs us that they are not. Can witchcraft be exercised through the agency of fragments? Aye; for the following proves it:

R. Hisda and Rabba b. R. Hana once travelled in a ship, and a matron who wanted to go on the same ship asked their permission to sit down near them, which they refused. She pronounced a certain word and the ship stood still, but they in turn pronounced a certain word and the ship moved on. She then said: “It grieves me sorely that I cannot inflict some punishment on you, seeing that you use no fragments for toilet purposes, nor do you kill the vermin in garments, nor do you pull out vegetables from a bundle (but cut the bundle first).” (Hence it may be seen that fragments can be used as a means for the exercise of witchcraft.)

R. Huna said to his son Rabba: Why do you not go more frequently to R. Hisda, who expounds the law so pointedly? Answered the son: “Of what use would it be? He never taught me but mere worldly knowledge, such as, for instance: Not to sit down to excrementize with a jerk nor to force myself too much, lest the intestines come out and endanger life.” R. Huna then rejoined: “Thou sayest ‘mere worldly knowledge.’ He is interested in the life of the people, and you call it mere worldly knowledge. So much the more should you go to him.”

R. Hisda and Rabhina differ as to the consequences of one withholding to perform his necessities. One is of the opinion that foul breath is the result, while the other holds that the entire body assumes a bad odor. The opinion of the latter is supported by the following Boraitha: “He who takes nourishment while in need of performing his necessities is compared to a stove in which a fire was built without previously removing the ashes, which is invariably the cause of a bad smell. One who feels like performing his necessities, but cannot do so, R. Hisda advises that he keep on sitting down and getting up until able. R. Hanan from Neherdai advises him to look for another place, but the rabbis say the sole remedy is to think of nothing else.”

The rabbis taught: One who is about to eat a hearty meal should walk ten times four ells or four times ten ells, then perform a (natural) necessity, and after that go in and sit down to the meal.

MISHNA V.: The prescribed quantity of fragments (of earthenware) is the size of such as are placed between two boards, is the decree of R. Jehudah. R. Meir says, of a size sufficient to stir a fire with. R. Jossi, of a size to receive (hold) a quarter of a lug. Said R. Meir: Although no positive proof for my assertion can be found in the Scripture, still a vague reference can be deduced from the passage [Isaiah, xxx. 14]: “So that there cannot be found among their fragments a sherd to rake fire from a hearth.” Said R. Jossi: “Therefrom you would adduce your proof? It says immediately after that [ibid., ibid.], ‘and to draw water from a pit.’”

GEMARA: We must assume that the prescribed quantity allowed by R. Jossi is larger than that allowed by R. Meir; but the scriptural text shows that R. Meir allows the larger; because, is it possible that the prophet will curse them with a larger object after having cursed them with a smaller? Said Abayi: R. Meir also means a fragment used to stir a big fire with; hence his fragment is larger than R. Jossi’s.

“Said R. Jossi,” etc. Is not R. Jossi’s answer correct? What could R. Meir rejoin? R. Meir might say that the prophet intends to convey that not only shall they not have anything of the least value left, but they shall not even have anything that is as valueless as a piece of fragment big enough to contain a drop of water.

Chapter IX
Rabbi Aqiba’s Regulations on Different Subjects

MISHNA I.: R. Aqiba said: Whence do we deduce that one who carries an idol is as unclean (ritually) as a woman suffering from menstruation? From the passage [Isaiah, xxx. 23]: “Thou wilt cast them away as a filthy thing. ‘Get thee hence!’, wilt thou say unto them.” Thus, in the same manner as a woman suffering from menstruation causes (ritual) uncleanness, so does also an idol.

GEMARA: Rabba said: The passage mentioned in the Mishna should be interpreted thus: “Estrange them from thyself as a stranger; Get thee hence, say unto him, but tell him not to come in!” Further Rabba said: It is unanimously conceded that the carrying of idols causes (ritual) uncleanness and hence it is compared to menstruation, but there is a dissenting opinion among the rabbis concerning a stone (used as a pedestal for an idol or upon which a woman suffering from menstruation chanced to sit) beneath which there were utensils. R. Aqiba holds that idols are regarded the same as menstruating women and the vessels beneath the stone become defiled (for the reason that the stone is the basis of the idol, and the former becomes part of the idol, and hence everything beneath it becomes defiled), but the rabbis regard an idol as a reptile, i.e., as a reptile lying upon a large stone (in which case any utensils chancing to be beneath the stone do not become defiled). This decree is unanimously conceded.

R. Ahadbou b. Ami asked: What about an idol smaller in size than an olive? R. Joseph objected to this question: What is the purpose of the query? Does it refer to the prohibition of idolatry? Even an idol the size of a fly, like the idol of the Ekronites, which was called Zebub (fly) is also prohibited; for we are taught it is written in the passage [Judges, viii. 33]: “And they made themselves Baal-berith for a god”; by Baal-berith is meant the Zebub (fly) idol of Ekron, and every idolater (at that time) made an image of his idol in miniature in order to keep it constantly at hand and to be able at any time to take it out, embrace, and kiss it; hence there is no question as to size. Nay, the query of R. Ahadbou is in regard to causing defilement? Either it is regarded as a reptile and defiles, even if only of the size of a lentil, or it is considered as a corpse and causes defilement if it is the size of an olive. (A part of a corpse the size of an olive causes the person touching it to become defiled.) Answered R. Ivia, and according to others Rabba b. Ulla: “Come and hear the following Boraitha: ‘No defilement is caused by idols smaller than olives, for it is written [II Kings, xxiii. 6]: “And cast its powder upon the graves of the children of the people.”’” (The adduction is) that as a corpse cannot cause defilement by a part less than the size of ail olive, the same is the case with idols, which are regarded as corpses.

MISHNA II.: (R. Aqiba says again:) Whence the adduction that a ship, though a wooden vessel, is not subject to defilement? From the passage [Prov. xxx. 19]: “The way of a ship is in the heart of the sea.”

GEMARA: It is certain that R. Aqiba intends to convey to us that the reason the passage cited in the above Mishna informs us of a fact known to all is because the sense is to be construed thus: In the same manlier as the sea is not subject to defilement, so also a ship call never become defiled.

There is a Boraitha: Hananyah said: We make the adduction from a sack (which is subject to defilement) that everything which can be carried after the manner of a sack, sometimes full and at other times empty, is subject to defilement, except a ship, which cannot be carried at all, full or empty. What are the points of difference in the two adductions (of R. Aqiba and Hananyah)? They are concerning a small (river) boat. One holds that all boats (ships) must be regarded as the sea itself (hence not subject to defilement), while the other is of the opinion that a small (river) boat must be regarded as a sack because it is carried to the place whence it is launched and hence is subject to defilement; as R. Hanina b. Aqa’bbia said: Why did the rabbis say that a small (river) boat is subject to defilement? Because it is usually loaded in the dry dock and then carried into the river.

Rabbi Johanan in the name of Rabbi said: “One should not absent himself from the college even for one hour. Behold, this teaching (concerning a river boat) has been taught in the schools for many years and no one knew the reason for it until R. Hanina b. Aqa’bbia came and explained it.”

R. Jonathan said: One should never absent himself from the house of learning or abstain from learning the law, even when at the point of death, for it is written [Num. xix. 14]: “This is the law, when a man dieth in his tent”; (i.e.) even at the point of death man must occupy himself with the study of the law. Resh Lakish, however, adduces from the same verse that one does not retain (in memory) the law, unless he is ready to die for it.

MISHNA III.: (R. Aqiba said:) Whence do we adduce that in a patch of ground six spans long by six spans wide five different kinds of seed may be planted — one kind each in each of the four corners and one in the centre of the patch? From the passage [Isaiah, lxi. 11]: “For as the earth bringeth forth her growth, and as a garden causeth what is sown therein to spring forth.” (We see then) it is not written “as a garden causeth its seed to spring forth,” but what is sown therein.

GEMARA: How is this to be understood from that passage? Said R. Jehudah: The passage cited in the above Mishna is to be thus explained: “The earth bringeth forth her growth.” “Bringeth forth” (which is in the singular) can be counted for “one” (kind of seed). Her “growth” (also singular) can also be counted for “one.” (Now we have two.) “What is grown therein” (evidently plural) can be counted for two more (making four), and “to spring forth” (in the singular again) can be counted as one, making five in all; and (as far as the six spans square are concerned) the rabbis are quite certain (through tradition) that five different kinds of seed in a patch six spans square do not interfere with one another. But whence do we know that the assurance of the rabbis can be depended upon? Answered R. Hyya b. Aba in the name of R. Johanan, from the passage [Deut. xix. 14]: “Thou shalt not remove the landmark of thy neighbor, which they of old time have set,” which is to be explained: “Thou shalt not go beyond what is limited by those of old.” But what have those of old limited? Answered R. Samuel bar Na’hmeni in the name of R. Jonathan: “It is written [Gen. xxxvi. 20]: “These are the sons of Seir the Chorite, who inhabited the land.” Only they inhabited the land? Did the rest of mankind inhabit heaven? It simply means to state that they made the earth inhabitable by their knowledge of agriculture and their experience as to what ground is adapted for the planting of olive trees, vines, date trees, etc.

R. Assi said: “The teaching of R. Aqiba in the Mishna refers to a patch of ground six spans square, excluding the corners.

Rabh said: “The above Mishna has reference only to an isolated patch (or furrow) of ground, but in a furrow surrounded by others one can not sow five kinds of grain, (as it is necessary to have a space of three spans dividing one kind from the other). Are there not corners, however, (to the furrow)?” The school of Rabh explained, in the name of Rabh, that reference is made to furrows into the corners of which grain had been sown.

Samuel, however, said, even in a furrow surrounded by other furrows. But will not the seeds interfere one with another? Samuel refers to furrows which are planted alternately from north to east and from south to west.

MISHNA IV.: (R. Aqiba says again): Whence the adduction that a woman, from whom seed of copulation escapes only on the third day (after lying with her husband), is unclean? From the passage [Exodus, xix. 15]: “And he said unto the people, Be ready against the third day. Approach not unto a woman.” Whence the adduction that a child may be bathed on the third day of its circumcision, even if that day fall on a Sabbath? From the passage [Gen. xxxiv. 25]: “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were sore.” Whence the adduction that a string of crimson wool must be tied on the head of the goat that was to be sent away? From the passage [Isaiah, i. 18]: “Though they should be red like crimson, they shall become (white) like wool.” Whence do we adduce that anointing one’s self on the Day of Atonement is equal to drinking? Although no positive proof is apparent, still a reference can be adduced from the passage [Psalms, cix. 18]: “And it cometh like water on his body and oil into his bones.”

GEMARA: The first part of the Mishna (treating of a woman) is not in accordance with the opinion of R. Elazar b. Azaryah, who declares her (the woman) clean in that case; the second part of the Mishna, however, (treating of bathing on the third day after circumcision) is in direct accord with his own words (as will be seen in Chapter XIX.). Therefore some rabbis claim that the first part of the Mishna reads clean instead of unclean, i.e., that the whole Mishna is according to the opinion of R. Elazar b. Azaryah, but other rabbis claim that the first part of the Mishna is according to the opinion of other Tanaim, who differ with Elazar b. Azaryah (and the word unclean is correct).

“And they shall be ready against the third day” [Ex. xix. 11]. R. Ada b. Ahbha said: “Moses went up (to the Mount Sinai) at daybreak, and descended the following break of day.” He went up at break of day, as it is written [Ex. xxxiv. 4]: “And Moses rose up early in the morning and went up unto Mount Sinai.” He descended on the following daybreak, as it is written [ibid. xix. 24]: “Go, get thee down, and then shalt thou come up, thou, and Aaron with thee.” We see that the Scripture compares the descending to the ascending, and as the ascending was early in the morning, so was also the descending early in the morning.

The rabbis taught: The decalogue was given to Israel on the sixth day of the (third) month, but R. Jossi said on the seventh day.

Said Rabba: All agree that on the first day of the (third) month the Israelites arrived at the wilderness of Sinai. It is adduced from the analogy of the word “this”; [Ex. xix. 1] “on this day they arrived at the wilderness of Sinai,” and [Ex. xii. 2] “this month to be to you the first of months.” As in the latter instance the “this” referred to the first, so does it also in the former; furthermore (he said), all agree that the law was given to Israel on a Sabbath; this is to be adduced from the analogy of the word “remember” [Ex. xx. 8]: “Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy”; and [ibid. iii. 3]: “Remember this day on which ye came out from Egypt.” As in the latter instance the very day of their coming out of Egypt is referred to, so is it also in the former instance. Where the rabbis do differ is what day was the first of the month. R. Jossi holds that the first of the month was set on the first of the week, and on that day no commandments were given, because the children of Israel were tired from their long journey. On the second day (of the week) the Lord said to them: “Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests” [Ex. xix. 1]. On the third of the week he commanded them to keep away from the mountain. On the fourth to separate themselves from their wives. The rabbis, however, hold that the first of the month was set on the second of the week; that on that day nothing was commanded the Israelites, they being tired; on the third the cited passage [Ex. xix. 1] was said; on the fourth day they were to keep away from the mountain, and on the fifth to separate themselves from their wives.

An objection was raised: It is written [Ex. xix. 10]: “Go unto the people, and sanctify them today and to-morrow.” Is this not contradictory to the statement of R. Jossi (in whose opinion the sanctification lasted three days)? R. Jossi may explain this thus: “Moses added one day upon his own authority,” as we have learned in a Boraitha: “Three things were done by Moses upon his own authority, and the Holy One, blessed be He, agreed thereto. They are: He added one day (to the period of sanctification), he separated himself from a woman, and he broke the tablets into pieces.” “He added one day upon his own authority.” What was his object? The Lord said unto him: “To-day and to-morrow,” and he construed the words as follows: “To-day must be equal (in duration) to tomorrow; as to-morrow includes the might, so must to-day; the night, however, having already passed, another day must be added in order to make up for the lost night.” Whence do we know that the Lord agreed to this? Because the Shekhina did not appear on Mount Sinai until the Sabbath morn. What was the object of Moses in separating himself from a woman? He applied the order given the Israelites (to separate themselves from their wives) to himself in a so much larger degree (i.e., the order having been issued to the Israelites for the reason that they would shortly hear the word of the Lord, it would be so much more proper for him, who frequently was spoken to by the Lord, to separate himself entirely from a woman). And whence do we know that the Lord agreed to this also? It is written [Deut. v. 27 and 28]: “Go, say to them, Return you unto your tents. But as for thee, remain thou here by me.” And what was his object in breaking the tablets? He thought: “As concerning the Passover sacrifice, which is only one of the six hundred and thirteen commandments, it is written [Ex. xii-43]: ‘No stranger shall eat thereof,’ how can I give the tablets, which contain all the commandments, to the children of Israel, who are now all renegades?” And whence do we know that the Holy One, blessed be He, agreed even to this? It is written [Ex. xxxiv. 1]: “And the Lord said unto Moses, Hew thyself two tables of stone like unto the first; and I will write upon these tables the words which were on the first tables which thou didst break.” Said Resh Lakish: “‘Which thou didst break’ really means, ‘which thou didst break rightfully.’”

Another objection was raised: It is written [Ex. xix. 11]: “And they shall be ready against the third day.” According to R. Jossi it should be the fourth day. This is no objection! as it is said above that Moses added another day upon his own authority. Come and hear another objection: “The sixth means the sixth of the week and of the month.” Is this not contradictory to the statement of the rabbis, who say: “The first of the month was the second day of the week?” Yea, (it may be that) this Boraitha holds to the opinion of R. Jossi.

Come and hear: On the fourteenth day of the month of Nissan, during which (month) the Israelites went out of Egypt, they killed the Passover sacrifice and on the fifteenth day they went out. On the night before that the first-born of the Egyptians were beaten. That day (the fifteenth) was the fifth of the week. Now, if the fifteenth of Nissan was the fifth of the week, we must certainly say that the first of the next month (Iar) was Sabbath and the first day of the following month (Sivan) was the first day of the week. Is this not contradictory to the statement of the rabbis, that the first day of the month was the second day of the week? The rabbis might have assumed that the month of Iar was an intercalary month.

Said R. Habibi of ‘Huzunah to R. Ashi: Come and hear: It is written [Ex. xl. 17]: “And it came to pass in the first month in the second year, on the first of the month, that the tabernacle was reared up,” and a Boraitha teaches that this day was crowned tenfold, viz.: “That day was the first of the six days of the creation; the first of the days on which the first prince presented his offering before the altar; the first of the days on which the priests (Aaron and sons) did their work in the sanctuary; the first day on which the children of Israel brought their sacrifices into the tabernacle; the first of the days on which the heavenly fire descended upon the altar; the first of the days on which the priests were permitted to eat the sacrifices in the tabernacle; the first of the days on which the Shekhina appeared in the tabernacle; the first day on which Aaron the High Priest blessed the Israelites in the tabernacle; the first of the days on which sacrifices were no more permitted to be brought on the high places outside of the tabernacle, and the first day of the first of the months.” Now, if the first day of this year was the first day of the week, we must say the first of Nissan of the preceding year fell on the fourth day of the week, because we have learned in another Boraitha:

“Anonymous teachers say that there can be not more than four days’ difference between one New Year’s day and another.” If a leap year intervened, then there may be a difference of five days. Is this not contradictory to the opinion of both the rabbis and R. Jossi? According to R. Jossi there were seven short months (of twenty-nine days) in that year, but according to the rabbis there were eight such months, (consequently the difference from the last year was only in two days,) as this year was an extraordinary one. (And the first day of the month Iar of the last year was on Friday.)

Another objection was raised: We have learned in the Tract Seder Aulim that on the fourteenth day of the month of Nissan, during which (month) the Israelites went out of Egypt, they killed the Passover sacrifice; on the fifteenth they went out, and that day was Friday. Now, if the first of the month of Nissan of that year was Friday, we must say that the first day of the following (Iar) month was on the first day of the week and the first of the succeeding month (Sivan) was on Monday. Is this not contradictory with R. Jossi? R. Jossi will then say that this Boraitha is in accordance with the opinion of the rabbis.

Come and hear another objection: R. Jossi says: “On the second day Moses went up on the Mount Sinai and came back. The same he did on the third day, but on the fourth day, when he came back, he remained.” Came back and remained? Whence did he come back — it does not say that he went up at all? Say, then, on the fourth day he went up, came back, and remained. On the fifth he built an altar and offered a sacrifice. On the sixth he had no time. Shall we assume that he had no time because on that day the Israelites received the Torah? (If we say that the second refers to the second day of the week, it must be a fact that the Torah was given on Friday, and would this not be a contradiction to his [R. Jossi’s] own opinion?) Nay; he had no time because the Sabbath was at hand.

A Galilean lectured in the presence of R. Hisda: Praised be the merciful God, who gave a triple law (the Pentateuch, Prophets, and Hagiographa) to a triple people (Kahanites, Levites, and Israelites) through a man who was the third child of his parents (Miriam, Aaron, and Moses), on the third day of sanctification and in the third month. We see from this that the Galilean held in accordance with the teachings of the rabbis.

It is written [Ex. xix. 17]: “And they placed themselves at the foot of the mount.” Said R. Abhdimi b. Hama b. Hassa: “It appears from this passage that the Holy One, blessed be He, inclined the mountain toward the children of Israel and gave them the choice of either accepting the Torah or being buried right under the mountain.” Said R. Aha b. Jacob: “This would accord us the right to protest against any punishment inflicted upon us for violating the law. (For we were compelled to accept it.)” Said Rabha: Although (at that time they were compelled to accept it), at the time of Ahasuerus (King of Persia) they accepted it voluntarily. For it is written [Esther, ix. 27]: “The Jews confirmed it as a duty, and took upon themselves and upon their seed.” And it is to be explained: “They took upon themselves voluntarily what at one time they were compelled to accept.” R. Simai lectured: “At that time, when Israel answered to the information of Moses, ‘We will do and we will obey,’ six hundred thousand angels had furnished to every one of Israel two crowns: one for the answer ‘We will do,’ and one for the answer ‘We will obey.’ Thereafter when Israel sinned (with the Golden Calf) twelve hundred thousand destroying angels descended and took them away; as it is written [Exodus, xxxiii. 6]: ‘The children of Israel then stripped themselves of their ornaments (they wore) from (the time they were at) Mount Horeb.’” Said R. Hami b. R. Hanina: “For in the same passage it may be deduced that in the same place where they were furnished they were taken away from them.” Said R. Johanan: All of them were given as a reward to Moses, as immediately after the verse cited it is written: “And Moses took the tent,” etc. Said Resh Lakish: We hope, however, that the Holy One, blessed be He, will return them to us, as it is written [Isaiah, xxxv. 10]: “And the ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come to Zion with song, with everlasting joy upon their head.” The expression everlasting means that it was already upon their heads at the time of reception of the Torah.

R. Elazar said: At the time the Israelites said “We will do” and afterward “We will obey” a heavenly voice (Bath-kol) was heard, which said unto them: “Who unfolded unto my children this mystery known only to the angels?” For it is written [Psalms, ciii. 20]: “Bless the Lord, ye his angels, mighty in strength, that execute his word, hearkening unto the voice of his word,” and from this we see that only angels can execute first and then obey.

A Sadducee once noticed Rabha studying and observed that he in his absent-mindedness held his (Rabha’s) finger underneath his knee and pressed it so hard that blood spurted from the finger. Said the Sadducee to him: “Impetuous people, whose mouths precede your ears! Ye are still of the same vehemence! Ye must first hear the Torah before you accept it and not accept without knowing its prescriptions!” Answered Rabha: We who are upright men trusted Him, as it is said of us [Proverbs, xi. 3]: “The integrity of the upright guideth them,” but to those men who are continually fault-finding the latter part of the same verse [ibid., ibid.] can be applied, viz. “But the cunning of the treacherous destroyeth them.”

R. Samuel b. Na’hmeni in the name of R. Jonathan said: It is written [Solomon’s Song, iv. 9]: “Thou hast ravished my heart, O my sister, (my) bride! thou hast ravished my heart with one of thy eyes.” This means: When thou didst but receive the Torah, it was with one of thy eyes. When thou wilt obey it, it will be with both of thy eyes.

R. Johanan said: It is written [Psalms, lxviii. 12]: “The Lord gave (happy) tidings; they are published by female messengers, a numerous host.” This implies that every word emanating from the mighty God was heralded in seventy languages. The school of R. Ishmael, however, (adduced the same from another passage): It is written [Jeremiah, xxiii. 29]: “Is not thus my word like the fire? saith the Lord, and like a hammer that shivereth the rock?” As the hammer that strikes emits a multitude of sparks, so, is every word emanating from the Holy One, blessed be He, heralded in seventy different languages.

R. Hananel b. Papa said: It is written [Proverbs, viii. 6]. “Hear! for of noble things will I speak.” Why are the words of the Torah compared to a noble? To inform us that inasmuch as a noble has in his power the disposal over life and death, so have also the words of the Torah. This is similar to what Rabha said: To those who walk in the right ways of the law, it is an elixir of life, but to those who pursue not the right way, it is the poison of death. R. Jehoshua b. Levi said: It is written [Solomon’s Song, i. 12]: “A bundle of myrrh is my friend unto me, that resteth on my bosom.” Said the Congregation of Israel: “Lord of the Universe! Although my friend chastiseth me, still he resteth on my bosom!”

The same rabbi said: “It is written [Solomon’s Song, v. 13]: “His cheeks are as a bed of spices, as turrets of sweet perfumes.” Every word emanating from the Holy One, blessed be He, fills the whole world with the aroma of spices. If the world was filled with the aroma arising from the first word, where could the second word go? The Holy One, blessed be He, sent forth a wind from His store, which cleared off the aroma of each word, as it is written [ibid.]: “His lips like lilies, dropping with fluid myrrh.” Do not read Shoshanim (lilies) but Sheshonim (learned men). The same said again that from each word which came from the Holy One, blessed be He, the soul of Israel was going out, as it is written [ibid., ibid. 6]: “My soul had failed me while he was speaking.” But the Holy One, blessed be He, has let down the dew with which He will in the future make the resurrection and bring them to life; as it is written [Psalms, lxviii. 10]: “Rain of beneficence didst thou pour down, O God!”

He also said: When Moses ascended into Heaven, said the angels before the Holy One, blessed be He, “Lord of the Universe! What has one born of a woman to do among us?”

The Lord answered: “He came to receive the Torah.” Said the angels again: “Wouldst Thou give a precious thing that Thou hast preserved since nine hundred and seventy-four generations before the creation of the world to a being of flesh and blood? (It is written [Psalms, viii. 5]): What is the mortal, that thou rememberest him? and the son of man, that thou thinkest of him?” Said the Holy One, blessed be He, unto Moses: “Give thou them an answer!” Answered Moses before the Lord: “Lord of the Universe! What is written in the law, which Thou gavest unto me?” [Ex. xx. 2]. “I am the Lord, thy God, who have brought thee out of the land of Egypt.” Moses then said to the angels: Were ye in Egypt? Have ye served Pharaoh? Of what use can the Torah be unto you? Further, what is written in the Torah [ibid. 3]: “Thou shalt have no other gods before me.” Are ye among the nations that worship idols? And furthermore, what is written in the Torah? [ibid. 8]: “Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy.” Do ye any labor on the week-days? [Ibid. 7]: “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.” Are ye merchants, that ye must swear? [Ibid. 13]: “Honor thy father and thy mother.” Have ye fathers and mothers to honor? [Ibid. 12]: “Thou shalt not kill,” etc. Is there any jealousy among you? Have ye any evil intent?

Then the angels confessed and praised the Holy One, blessed be He, as it is written [Psalms, viii. 10]: “O Eternal One, our Lord, how excellent is thy name on all the earth!” but the ending of the verse [ibid. 2], “Thou who hast set thy majesty above the heavens,” is not cited in this verse. Then every one of the angels befriended Moses and each of them disclosed some mystery to him, as it is written [Psalms, lxviii. 19]: “Thou didst ascend on high, lead away captives, receive gifts among men,” which means that because at first the angels called Moses one born of a woman (man), they at the close gave him gifts, and even the Angel of Death disclosed a mystery to him, as it is written [Num. xvii. 12 and 13]: “And he put on the incense, and made an atonement for the people. And he stood between the dead and the living.” Now if the Angel of Death had not disclosed unto Moses this mystery, how could he have imparted it to Aaron?

Said R. Jehoshua b. Levi again: When Moses descended from Heaven, Satan came before the Holy One, blessed be He, and said: “Lord of the universe! Where is the Torah?” And the Lord answered: “I have given it to the earth.” Satan descended to earth and said to it: “Where is the Torah?” And the earth answered [Job, xxviii. 23]: “God (alone) understandeth her way, and he knoweth her place.” Satan then went to the sea, and the sea said: “She is not with me.” He then went to the deep, and the deep answered: “Not in me is she,” as it is written [ibid. 14]: “The deep saith, Not in me is she; and the sea saith, She is not with me.” [Ibid. 22]: “Perdition and death say: With our ears have we heard a report of her.” Satan then ascended before the Holy One, blessed be He, and said: “Lord of the Universe! I have looked for the Torah on the whole earth and could not find it.” Then said the Lord unto him: “Go unto the son of Amram.” And Satan went to Moses and said to him: “Where is the Torah which the Holy One, blessed be He, gave unto thee?” And Moses answered: “Who am I, that the Holy One, blessed be He, should give me the Torah?” Said the Lord unto Moses: “Moses, art thou a liar?” Said Moses before the Lord: “Lord of the Universe! Shall I claim that Thou hast given unto me a precious thing which Thou didst fondle every day?” Said the Holy One, blessed be He, unto Moses: “Because thou hast humbled thyself, the Torah shall bear thy name,” as it is written [Malachi, iii. 22]: “Remember ye the law of Moses my servant.”

The same rabbi said again: When Moses ascended unto Heaven (and he was silent), the Lord said unto him: “Moses, is there no peace in thy city?” And Moses answered: “Is it then proper that a slave should salute his Master?” Said the Lord: “Still thou shouldst have wished me well.” Then said Moses before the Lord [Numbers, xiv. 17]: “And now, I beseech thee, let the greatness of the power of the Lord be made manifest as thou hast spoken.”

“A string of crimson wool,” etc. Did not the passage say (Kashanim) “like years” and not like crimson, for were it like crimson it would read Kashani? Said R. Itz’hak: “The passage is thus to be explained: The Lord said unto Israel: If your sins all lie before me as the years that have passed since the creation, they shall nevertheless become white as snow.”

Rabha lectured: It is written [Isaiah, i. 18]: “Go now, and let us reason together, said the Lord.” It should not read “go now” but “come now,” and not “saith the Lord” but “said the Lord.” The passage should be explained: In the future the Lord will say unto Israel: Go to your ancestors and they shall rebuke you; and Israel will say before the Lord: Lord of the Universe, to whom shall we go? Shall we go to Abraham, to whom Thou hast said: “Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land which is not theirs, and they will make them serve,” and he did not pray for us? Shall we go to Isaac, who, when blessing Esau, said [Gen. xxvii. 40]: “And it shall come to pass that when thou shalt have the dominion thou canst break his yoke from off thy neck,” and he also did not pray for us? Shall we go to Jacob, to whom Thou didst say [Gen. xlvi. 4]: “I will go down with thee into Egypt,” and not even he prayed for us? To whom shall we go now? Then the Lord will say unto Israel:

“Inasmuch as ye have attached yourselves to me, though your sins should be as scarlet, they shall become white as snow.”

Said R. Samuel b. Na’hmeni in the name of R. Jonathan: It is written [Isaiah, lxiii. 16]: “For Thou art our Father; for Abraham knoweth nothing of us, and Israel recognizeth us not; Thou, O Lord, art our Father, our Redeemer from everlasting is thy name.” In the future the Holy One, blessed be He, will say to Abraham: “Thy children have sinned before me,” and Abraham will answer: “Let them be wiped off (the face of the earth) for the sake of the holiness of Thy name.” The Holy One, blessed be He, will then say: “I shall tell this to Jacob, who had trouble in rearing his own children; perhaps he will pay for the present generation.” The Lord said to Jacob: “Thy children have sinned before me,” and Jacob gave the same reply as Abraham. Then said the Lord: “Not with the aged can feeling be found, nor with the young wise counsel.” The Lord then said to Isaac: “Thy children have sinned before me.” Then said Isaac before the Lord: “Creator of the universe! Thou sayest my children, are they not Thine? When they answered before Thee, ‘We will do,’ and (then) ‘obey,’ Thou calledst them ‘My son, my first-born,’ and now they are my children and not Thine! And furthermore, how long a time have they sinned before Thee? Let us see; what is the duration of a man’s life? Only seventy years. Take off the twenty years that Thou dost not punish for sin and only fifty remain. Take off the nights and only twenty-five full years remain. Deduct again twelve years and six months spent in praying, eating, and in the performance of other necessities, only twelve and one-half years remain. If Thou wilt bear the whole it is well, but if not let me bear half and Thou the other half. If Thou wilt say that I must bear the whole, did I not sacrifice myself for Thee?” Then Israel said (unto Isaac): “For thou (alone) art our father.” Said Isaac unto them: “Instead of praising me, praise ye the Holy One, blessed be He,” and he pointed them on high with his finger. “There is the Lord!” Then they lifted up their eyes unto Heaven and said: Thou, O Lord, art our Father, our Redeemer from everlasting is Thy name.

R. Hyya b. Aba said in the name of R. Johanan: “Jacob deserved to go down into Egypt in iron shackles (because that is the usual way of going into exile), but his merits precluded such a thing, as it is written: “With human cords I ever drew them forward, with leading-strings of love; and I was to them as those that lift off the yoke from their jaws, and I held out unto them food” [Hosea, xi. 4].

MISHNA V.: The prescribed quantity for wood is as much as suffices to cook an (easily boiled) egg; for spices as much as would suffice to spice such an egg — and the different spices are counted together; nut-shells, pomegranate peel, isatis, and cochineal, as much as suffices to dye the edge of a small piece of cloth; alum, native carbonate of soda, Cimolia chalk, vegetable soap, as much as suffices to wash the edge of a small piece of cloth. R. Jehudah says as much as will suffice to remove a blood stain.

GEMARA: Have we not learned this already? Reeds, split, as much as will suffice to cook an egg? In that case we must assume that the reeds could not be used for any other purpose, but wood which can be put to a multitude of uses, as, for instance, to make the handle for a key, (should be limited to a smaller quantity). He comes to teach us that the same quantity also applies in this case.

“Nut-shells,” etc. Is this not a contradiction to what we have learned elsewhere, that dyes may not be carried in quantities sufficient to exhibit a sample of the color in the market? Said R. Na’hman in the name of Rabba b. Abuhu: “Because one will not take the trouble to make dye sufficient only for a sample.”

“Native carbonate,” etc. A Boraitha in addition to this states, that coming from Alexandria but not from Anphantrin.

“Vegetable soap” (Ashleg). Said Samuel: “I have inquired of a number of seafaring men and they have told me that the name for it is Ashalgoh; it is found in the shells of a pearl-oyster and it is extracted with iron needles.”

MISHNA VI.: The prescribed quantity for (aromatic) pepper (pimento) is the least possible amount; for tar it is the same; for different kinds of spices and metals it is also the same; for the stone and the earth of the altar, torn pieces of the scroll of laws or its cover, it is also the same, because such things are generally preserved by men. R. Jehudah said: The same quantity applies to everything pertaining to the worship of idols, because it is written [Deut. xiii. 18]: “And there shall not cleave to thy hand aught of the devoted things.”

GEMARA: To what use can such a small quantity of pepper be put? It may be used by one whose breath is foul.

“For tar.” For what purpose can tar in so small a quantity be used? It may be used by one who has the sickness Tzilchathah (an illness where only one-half of the head aches).

“For different kinds of spices.” The rabbis taught: The prescribed quantity both for aromatic spices as well as for ill-smelling oils is the same (least possible quantity); for purple dye also the same, and for roses only one rosebud.

“And metals.” Of what use are they? We have learned, R. Simon b. Elazar said: They can be used to make a goad.

“The torn pieces of the scroll of laws.” Said R. Jehudah: Book-worms, silk-worms, vine-worms, date-worms, and pomegranate-worms are all dangerous to human life. There was a disciple sitting before R. Johanan eating dates, and the disciple said to him: “Rabbi, there are thorns in the dates.” Said the rabbi: “The date-worm (Pah) has killed this man.”

MISHNA VII.: One who carries the chest of a spice dealer is liable for one sin-offering only, although there may be many spices in the chest. The prescribed quantity for garden seeds is the equivalent in size to a dried fig. R. Jehudah b. Bathyra said. Five different seeds. The prescribed quantity for cucumber seeds are two, for pumpkin seeds the same, for Egyptian beans the same; a living locust (which may be eaten), be it ever so small, must not be carried, but dead locusts may be carried in quantities less than a dried fig. The prescribed quantity for vineyard birds living or dead is the smallest possible quantity, because they were preserved for medicinal purposes. R. Jehudah said: One must not carry out a living locust, (which must not be eaten), be it ever so small, because such locusts were kept as playthings for small children.

GEMARA: “Cucumber seeds.” The rabbis taught: The prescribed quantity for seeds used for planting is two, but for seeds used for food it is the equivalent of a pig’s mouthful. How much is a pig’s mouthful? The seeds of one cucumber. For cucumber seeds used as fuel the prescribed quantity is as much as will suffice to cook an egg; for cucumber seeds used as counters (for figures) only two. Anonymous teachers say five.

The rabbis taught: One who carries two hairs from the tail of a horse or a cow is culpable, because the hairs are always preserved for making nets. The prescribed quantity for hog bristles is only one; for willows (used for wickerwork) two; for tree-bark one strip.

“R. Jehudah says: A locust (which must not be eaten),” etc. Why did not the first Tana of the Mishna mention this? Because in his opinion it is forbidden to carry it even on week-days, lest one eat it. If such is the case, why should an eatable locust be allowed to be carried? Did not R. Kahana stand before Rabh and a small locust lighted on his lips: Rabh said to him: (R. Kahana), Take it away, lest people say that thou hast eaten it and thou hast violated the commandment [Leviticus, xi. 43]: “Ye shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping thing that creepeth”? Nay; there was no fear that the locust would be eaten alive, but they apprehended lest it die and then be eaten. (An eatable locust would not matter, but an uneatable locust would be a violation of the law.) If that is the case, why does R. Jehudah permit this? R. Jehudah holds that there is no fear of the locust being eaten when dead, as the child will mourn its death.

Chapter X
Further Regulations Concerning the Prescribed Quantity of Things to be Stored

MISHNA I.: One who had stored anything for planting, sampling, or medicinal purposes (before the Sabbath) and carried some of it out (into public ground) on the Sabbath, be it ever so small a quantity, is liable for a sin-offering. Any one else, however, is culpable only then if (he carried out) the prescribed quantity. Even the one who had stored is culpable only for the prescribed quantity, if he brought the thing carried out by him back (to private ground).

GEMARA: For what purpose is it said in the Mishna, “One who stored anything”? Would it not be sufficient to say, “One who carried out things intended for planting, sampling, or medicinal purposes, be the quantity ever so small, is culpable”? Said Abayi: The Mishna treats of the case of a man who, after storing the thing, forgot for what purpose he had stored it, and then carried it out into the street for any purpose whatever. Lest one say that the original intention (to store it) is abolished, and now the thing carried out has for him only the same value as for others, and he would be culpable only for carrying out the regularly prescribed quantity, it comes to teach us that one who commits a deed executes his original intention.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: R. Meir declares one who carried out only a single wheat grain, intended for sowing, culpable. Is this not self-evident? The Mishna taught: “Be it ever so small.” One might presume that the term “be it ever so small” denotes something smaller than a dried fig but not smaller than an olive. R. Meir therefore informs us (that it refers even to one wheat grain). R. Itz’hak, the son of R. Jehudah, opposed this: “(We see that) the Mishna declares one culpable for an act originally intended to be performed, but now, supposing a man intended to carry out his entire household at once; is he then not culpable until he had accomplished the entire task, even if he had carried out part of it?” The answer was: If a man has an absurd intention it is abolished by the law, and he is culpable for carrying out the prescribed quantity.

“Any one else, however,” etc. Our Mishna is not in accordance with that of R. Simeon b. Elazar (on page 145).

Rabha in the name of R. Na’hman said: “If one carried out a thing the size of a dried fig with the intention of eating it, but changed his mind in the meantime and then intended to sow it, or, on the contrary, first intended to sow it and then to eat it, he is culpable. Is this not self-evident? The prescribed quantity for both eating and sowing was carried. Lest one say that the removing and the depositing of a thing must be done with the very same intention in order to make one culpable, which is not so in this case, he comes to teach us that he is culpable.

“If he brought the thing,” etc. Is this not self-evident? (for he did not sow it, we then see that his original intention is abolished). Said Abayi: “The Mishna speaks of a case where the man took the thing brought from his house, and threw it into the place where his full supply was kept, and the place where he threw it remained conspicuous. Lest one say, if the place is conspicuous, his original intention is not yet abolished, because he took the same thing again, it comes to teach us that the throwing of the thing among his other supplies annulled his original intention.

MISHNA II.: If one intended to carry out victuals and deposited them on the doorstep, whether he afterward carried them out (into the street) himself, or this was done by some one else, he is not culpable, because he did not accomplish the deed at one time. If one deposited a basket of fruit on the outside doorstep, even if the bulk of the fruit was on the outside (in the street), he is not culpable, unless he carried out the entire basket (into the street).

GEMARA: What kind of a doorstep does the Mishna have reference to? Should we assume that the doorstep was public ground, how can the man be not culpable? He carried out from private into public ground. Should we assume that the doorstep was private ground, why does the Mishna teach that if he carried it out (into the street), or any one else, he is not culpable? It is again a case of carrying out from private into public ground? We must therefore assume that the doorstep was unclaimed ground, and it comes to teach us that only when the victuals were deposited on the unclaimed ground the man is not culpable, but if they had been carried out from private into public ground, even by way of unclaimed ground, he is culpable. And the Mishna does not agree with the opinion of Ben Azai, of the following Boraitha: “One who carries out from his store into the market by way of the alley is culpable, but Ben Azai says he is not.”

“If one deposited a basket of fruit,” etc. Said Hyzkiyah: The case in question treats only of a basket filled with cucumbers and beets, but if full of mustard seeds he is culpable. From this we see that Hyzkiyah considers a vessel no support (i.e., the cucumbers are encircled by the basket and need no support), but the mustard seeds, which are heaped up, are outside of the basket proper and not supported by it; therefore, when the basket with mustard seeds is carried outside, part of the mustard seeds are already on the outside and the carrier is culpable. R. Johanan, however, says, even if the basket contained mustard seeds, he is also not culpable. Thence we see that R. Johanan does consider a vessel a support. Said R. Zera: “How is it with the Mishna? It is neither of the opinion of Hyzkiyah nor of R. Johanan.” Hyzkiyah may explain it in accordance with his theory and R. Johanan with his own. Hyzkiyah explains the Mishna, which said “unless he carries out the entire basket.” This is the case if the basket is filled with cucumbers and beets, but if filled with mustard seeds it is equal to putting out the entire basket into the street, and he is culpable, but R. Johanan explained the Mishna thus: Although the bulk of the fruit is on the outside, or even if all the fruit were on the outside, the man would not be culpable unless the entire basket was put on the outside. So also said Rabha: The Mishna treats only of a basket filled with cucumbers and beets, but if filled with mustard seeds the man is culpable. Whence we see that he does not consider a vessel a support. Abayi, however, said: Even if the basket contained mustard seeds, the man is also not culpable. Whence we see that he does consider a vessel a support. Shall we say that Abayi adopted the system of Rabha and Rabha of Abayi, or Abayi contradicts himself and Rabha does the same? As it was taught: One who carried out fruit into public ground, Abayi said, is culpable only if he carried it out with his hand (although the body remained in public ground), but if in a vessel he is not culpable. (Why? Because Abayi does not consider the body a support to the hand, in spite of the fact that the hand is attached to the body, but if he carried out the fruit in a vessel and part of the vessel still remained in private ground, he is not culpable.) And Rabha says, on the contrary: If he carried the fruit out in his hand he is not culpable (because he considers the body a support and the hand is part of the body), but if he carried it out in a vessel he is culpable (because, although the vessel is still in private ground, some of the fruit is in public ground). The answer is: Reverse the case. (Say Abayi’s statement should be Rabha’s and Rabha’s Abayi’s).

MISHNA III.: One who carries out anything in the right or in the left hand or in his bosom or on his shoulder is culpable, as so was the manner in which the sons of Kehath carried (their burdens). But one who carries out a thing on the back of his hand or with his foot, with his mouth, with his elbow, with his ear, with his hair, with his waist bag, the opening of which is at the bottom, or between his belt and his shirt, with the edge of his shirt, with his shoe or sandal, is not culpable, because he carries it in an unusual manner.

GEMARA: R. Elazar said: “One who carries out a burden ten spans above the ground [not on his shoulder, but in the air] is culpable, because in this manner the sons of Kehath carried their burdens.” Whence do we know that the sons of Kehath carried their burdens in this way? It is written [Numb. iii. 26]: “Which is by the tabernacle and by the altar round about.” Hence he compares the tabernacle to the altar. As the tabernacle was ten ells, so was also the altar ten ells; and whence do we know that the tabernacle itself was ten ells? Because it is written [Ex. xxvi. 16]: “Ten ells shall be the length of the boards.” Or we may say that we know that the sons of Kehath carried their burdens in this manner from the ark, as the Master said: The ark was nine spans high, and with the cover, which was one span higher, it was ten. Experience is to the effect that when a burden was carried on the shoulders by means of poles, one-third of the burden was above the poles and two-thirds below; then as the ark was ten spans high and one-third of it was carried above the shoulders, it was certainly more than ten spans above the ground.

But let it be inferred from Moses himself, of whom it is said elsewhere that he was very tall. With Moses the case is different; as the Master said elsewhere that the Shekhina does not rest upon a man unless he is a scholar, a strong, rich, or tall man.

It was taught: One who carries a burden on his head is not culpable. And if one will say that the inhabitants of the city of Hutzal do so, we may assume that their deed is abolished by the rest of mankind, who do not carry burdens on their heads.

MISHNA IV.: One who intends to carry something in front, but the thing moved to his back, is not culpable, but if he intends to carry it on his back and it moves to the front he is. Of a truth it was said: A woman who wears a girdle, whether she carries something in the front or in the back of it, is culpable, because the girdle invariably turns around. R. Jehudah says the same rule applies to letter-carriers.

GEMARA: Where is the difference? The main object (here is the intention). And in either case his intention was not carried out; why is he not culpable if the thing, moved from the front to the back and culpable if it moved from the back to the front? Said R. Elazar: “Divide the Mishna into two parts. The second part was not taught by the same Tana as the first.” Said R. Ashi: “This is no question at all. Perhaps the Mishna may be explained thus: Not only did the man intend to carry it on his back and did so, which would make him culpable, because his intention was carried out, but even if he intended to carry it on his back and it moved to the front, in which case his intention was not carried out, lest one say that then he is not culpable, it comes to teach us that when one intends to preserve the thing with little safety, and it occurs that he has done so with a proper safety, he is benefited by it; hence he is culpable.”

“Of a truth it was said.” There is a Boraitha: Wherever it is said “Of a truth it was said,” it is to be considered that so the Halakha prevails.

“R. Jehudah says the same rule applies to letter-carriers.” A Boraitha in addition to it states that so it is because the carriers of the government usually do so.

MISHNA V.: One who carries out a large loaf of bread into public ground is culpable. If two persons do this together they are both innocent, provided it could be done by one of them; if, however, they did so because it could not be done by one, both are culpable. R. Simeon, however, declares them not culpable.

GEMARA: Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh, according to others Abayi said, and still others say that it was learned in a Boraitha: “If of both men who carried the loaf, either was able to carry it himself, R. Meir makes them both culpable, but R. Jehudah and R. Simeon declare them both innocent. If, of the two, neither was able (to do it himself), R. Jehudah and R. Meir declare them culpable and R. Simeon declares them free. If one of the two, however, was able, and the other unable, all agree that the able man is culpable.” Whence is all this deduced? From what the rabbis taught: It is written [Lev. iv. 2]: “If any person sin,” etc., i.e., if he committed the whole deed but not a part of it. How so? If two persons held one pitchfork and threw grain with it, or a weaver’s spindle and wove with it, or a quill and wrote with it, or a reed and carried it into public ground, one might say that they are culpable. It is written [ibid.]: “If any person sin,” etc. But if two persons held a date-press, or a log, and carried them out into public ground, R. Jehudah says, if one of the two was not able to carry it himself and they both carried it, they are both culpable, but if either of them was able, both are not culpable. R. Simeon says, even if one alone is not able to carry it and they carried it out together, they are also free. For only referring to such an instance the Scriptures say: “If any person,” etc., and it is plain that one is culpable if he performs work alone, but if two persons did one thing they are both free.

The master said: If one of the two was able to perform the work alone and the other unable, all agree that he is culpable. Which of them was culpable? R. Hisda said, the one who was able. As to the one who was unable, why should he be so? What did he? Said R. Hamnuna to R. Hisda: “Why not? Did he not assist the one who was able? Answered R. Hisda: Assisting is not of consequence (because if he alone is not able to perform the work himself, his assistance is of no value). Said R. Zbid in the name of Rabha: “We have also learned in a Boraitha in support of this argument: If one suffering from a venereal disease rides an animal, the feet of which are encased in four pieces of cloth, the pieces of cloth are not subject to defilement, for the reason that the animal is able to stand on three feet.” Why are they not subject to defilement? Was not one foot a help to the other three? Hence we must assume that one of the feet must be regarded as a help to the other three; a mere help, however, not having any legal consequence cannot become defiled, and as it is impossible to determine which one of the three feet is to be regarded as a help, all four pieces of cloth encasing them are not subject to defilement.

Again the master said: If either of the two were able, R. Meir holds them both to be culpable. The schoolmen propounded a question: “Must the object carried out by them be of double the prescribed size, i.e., a prescribed size for each of them, in order to make them culpable, or does the prescribed size for one man suffice to make them both culpable? R. Hisda and R. Hamnuna (both answered): One of them held that one prescribed size suffices, and the other that it must be double in order to make them culpable, (and it is known which of them held to the former opinion and which to the latter). Said R. Ashi: “We have also learned in a Boraitha: ‘Two men who carried out a reed used by a weaver (into the street) are both culpable.’ Why so? Was not double the prescribed quantity necessary in order to make both culpable? Hence we must assume that the Boraitha holds one prescribed quantity to be sufficient.” Said R. Aha, the son of Rabba, to R. Ashi: “What proof do you derive from this Boraitha? Perhaps it refers to a reed that was of sufficient size to cook an egg for one and another for the other?” R. Ashi answered: If such were the case, the Boraitha would say merely a “reed” and not a “reed used by a weaver.” Said R. Aha again: “Perhaps the Boraitha refers to a reed of sufficient size to weave a napkin each for both of them? Therefore it were better to say that from this Boraitha we can derive no support either for one opinion or the other.”

A certain scholar taught in the presence of R. Na’hman: “Two men who carried out a reed used by a weaver (into the street) are both not culpable.” R. Simeon, however, declares them culpable. How can this be? (Is this not contrary to R. Simeon’s usage?), Read then (on the contrary), the scholars said they are culpable and R. Simeon said they are not.

MISHNA VI.: If one carry victuals of less than the prescribed quantity in a vessel (out into the street) he is not culpable even of (carrying) the vessel, for the vessel is of no consequence to the victuals. If he carried a person on a litter he is not culpable even of (carrying) the litter, because the litter is of no consequence to the person. If he carried a corpse on a cot he is culpable. The same is the case if (he carries) a part of the corpse of the size of an olive or of a carcass the size of an olive and of a reptile the size of a lentil. R. Simeon declares all of them free.

GEMARA: The rabbis taught: “If a man carry out victuals of the prescribed quantity in a vessel, he is culpable of carrying the victuals, but not of (carrying) the vessel, because the vessel is of no consequence to the victuals; but if the victuals are such that they cannot be carried otherwise than in a vessel, he is culpable of (carrying) the vessel also.” Shall we assume from this teaching that if one ate two pieces of tallow each the size of an olive at different times through forgetfulness (and was not reminded of his sin between both times of eating), he is bound to bring two sin offerings? Said R. Ashi: In the case of the man who is culpable of (carrying) both the victuals and the vessel, it must be assumed that he carried them through forgetfulness and was subsequently reminded of having carried only one of them (but forgot about the other); later he was reminded of having carried the other also, and according to the opinion of the teacher of this Boraitha, he is culpable and bound to bring two sin-offerings, one for each time he was reminded. The same difference of opinion exists here as we have seen existed between R. Johanan and R. Simeon b. Lakish (in the chapter concerning the general rule of Sabbath).

“If he carried a person in a litter,” etc. Shall we assume that the Mishna is in accordance with R. Nathan and not with the rabbis of the following Boraitha? “If one carried out an animal or a bird (into the street), whether alive or slaughtered, he is liable.” R. Nathan, however, says: “For (carrying out) a slaughtered (animal or bird) he is culpable, but not for one that is alive, because a live creature carries itself.” Said Rabha: “It may be said the Mishna is in accordance with the rabbis of the Boraitha cited, as they differ with R. Nathan only concerning animals or birds, which usually struggle to get loose and thus become a burden; but concerning a person, who is carried and agrees to being carried, and virtually carries himself, the rabbis yield to R. Nathan.”

Said R. Ada b. Ahba to Rabha: How will, in your opinion, the statement in our Mishna be made plain: “Ben Bathyra permits the selling of a horse to a Gentile, and a Boraitha, in addition to this, states that the reason that Ben Bathyra permits this is because the Gentile will not perform any work with the horse on a Sabbath that would involve the liability of a sin-offering (for a horse is used for riding only, and when a person rides a horse the person virtually carries himself, and hence is no burden to the horse), and R. Johanan says that Ben Bathyra and R. Nathan said (practically) the same thing.” Now, if in your opinion the rabbis differ with R. Nathan only in the matter of animals and birds, because when carried they struggle for freedom, but agree with him in the matter of a person, why does R. Johanan say that only Ben Bathyra and R. Nathan say the same thing? Did not the rabbis also admit this? (The answer was:) R. Johanan said that Ben Bathyra in permitting a horse to be sold to a Gentile referred to one which was used only for carrying falcons. Are there then such horses? Yea; they are to be found at the Zaidons’.

R. Johanan said: Even R. Nathan holds a man culpable if he carries a person, animal, or bird that is bound.

“If he carried a corpse,” etc. Said Rabba b. b. Hana in the name of R. Johanan, and the same was said by R. Joseph in the name of R. Simeon b. Lakish: R. Simeon frees one, even if he carries out a corpse for burial. Said Rabha: “Even R. Simeon concedes that if one carry out a spade to dig a grave with, or a scroll to read from, he is culpable.” Is this not self-evident?

Should we then assume that according to R. Simeon’s opinion even this kind of labor is not labor for its own sake, how can we find any labor for its own sake which in the opinion of R. Simeon would involve the liability of a sin-offering? Lest one say that R. Simeon does not hold a man culpable for carrying a thing unless the work done with the thing is both for the man’s sake and also for the sake of the thing itself — for instance, if the spade was needed for digging and also had to be sharpened, or the scroll had to be examined and used for reading — hence he informs us that such is not the case.

There was a corpse in Drokra and R. Na’hman b. Itz’hak permitted it to be carried out into unclaimed ground. Said R. Johanan, the brother of Mar, son of Rabhina, to R. Na’hman b. Itz’hak: “According to which Tana’s opinion do you act? According to R. Simeon? Did R. Simeon allow this? He only stated that the act does not involve the liability of a sin-offering, but he did not permit it to start with?” R. Na’hman answered: By the Lord! You yourself, and even R. Jehudah, would allow this to be done the same as I did; did I say that it was to be carried into public ground? I said unclaimed ground! Do not forget that this was also for the sake of the honor due a human being, of which it is said: “Precious is the honor of man, and for its sake even a direct commandment of the Scripture may be circumvened!”

MISHNA VII.: One who pares his finger-nails, either by means of his nails or by means of his teeth; also one who plucks hair from his head, beard, or lip; also a woman who braids her hair, or paints her eyebrows, or parts her hair, is, according to R. Eliezer, culpable. The sages, however, declare this to be (prohibited only by rabbinical law) as a precautionary measure.

GEMARA: Said R. Elazar: “The difference of opinion exists only in the case of paring the finger-nails by means of the nails, but if taken off with an instrument (all agree) that he is culpable.” Is this not self-evident? Is it not plainly written in the Mishna, if he pares his finger-nails, one by means of the others? One might think that the difference of opinion is also concerning an instrument, and the reason the Mishna does not mention an instrument is only to show the firmness of R. Eliezer in prohibiting the paring of finger-nails even with one’s own nails. He informs us that the difference of opinion is concerning the nails only. R. Elazar said furthermore: “The difference of opinion is only concerning a man’s paring his own finger-nails, but if he pared another’s all agree that he is not culpable. (The reason for this is because when paring one’s own finger-nails a man can make them look as if trimmed with an instrument, but when trimming another’s this is not possible.)” Is this not self-evident? Did not the Mishna say plainly: “His own finger-nails”? Nay. One might think that according to the opinion of R. Eliezer the trimming of another’s finger-nails also makes one culpable, but the Mishna, stating plainly “his own finger-nails,” intends only to show the firmness of the rabbis in making not culpable even those who pare their own nails; therefore he informs that such is not the case.

“Also one who plucks hair from his head,” etc. There is a Boraitha: “One who cuts off a scissorsful of hair from his bead on the Sabbath is culpable.” How much is a scissorsful supposed to be? Two hairs. R. Eliezer says: “One.” The rabbis agree with R. Eliezer that in case one gray hair is plucked from a number of black hairs a man is culpable even for one, and not only on Sabbath but even on week days it is also prohibited, as it is written [Deut. xxii. 5]: “And a man shall not put on a woman’s garment.”

We have learned in a Boraitha, R. Simeon b. Elazar said: “If a finger-nail become separated from the finger of its own accord, a man may remove the adhering part, providing the greater part of the nail was separated. He may do this with his fingers, but not with an instrument. If he did it, however, with an instrument, he is not liable for a sin-offering. If the smaller part only was separated, he may not remove it. If he did so, however, with his fingers, he is not culpable, but with an instrument he is. Said R. Jehudah: “The Halakha prevails in accordance with R. Simeon b. Elazar.” Said Rabba b. b. Hana in the name of R. Johanan “Provided the nail was bent upward and was troublesome.”