(Fons Vitae)

by
Solomon Ibn Gabirol

Translated by Harry E. Wedeck (1962)

Introduction

The Fons Vitae of Solomon Ibn Gabirol (1021-1058/70) is essentially an eleventh century attempt to present the first part of wisdom as the source of life for the intellectually oriented Jews of the Western world. As such it suffered almost complete sterility right from the start. Written in Arabic, it seems to have by-passed the greater majority of Gabirol's own Jewish contemporaries. And, even when translated in the twelfth century into Latin by the combined efforts of Ibn Daud (Avendehut), who is better known by his assumed Christian name of John of Spain, and Dominic Gundissalin it was not immediately recognized as a work in medieval Jewish philosophy. This was probably due to the fact that the author of this work was designated by the Arabic form of his name: Avicebron. The florilegia selected and translated into Hebrew by Shem Tob Fahquera (1225-1290) made scant impression on his contemporaries, if we can judge from the fact that only one manuscript of it seems to have been circulated. Another fundamental reason for its lack of influence on the Jewish world may be the fact that Gabirol never betrays his Jewish commitments by the insertion of biblical phrases or references to the vast literature of Talmudic developments. Indeed, the neo-platonic linguistic structures and their somewhat Christian adaptations made his work appear positively non-Jewish. Abraham Ibn Daud (ca. 1110-1180) actually criticizes Gabirol for treating such an important topic, that has so many religious implications, in a purely rationalistic way and, also, for expressing teachings apparently dangerous to Judaism itself. Later evaluations bring out the obvious lack of an appealing style, quite unexpected in a work by one recognized as pre-eminent in poetry.

The course of the Fons Vitae reached more fertile ground in the western Christian world of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The very fact that Raymond, Archbishop of Toledo, had the translation prepared was some indication of the reception it was to get later. Its obvious neoplatonic orientation was welcomed by medieval schoolmen, already nourished by the speculations on universal hylomorphism derived from the writings of Augustine and elaborated within the Augustinian view of formlessness as the root distinction separating God and creatures. The wisdom of God and the wisdom of man meet quite amicably in the concept of a Will overflowing with light that enlightens every man, that perfects every thing and illumines the path from the First Author, supreme and holy, to the least manifestation of reality, the substance supporting the nine categories. Though there appears to be in Gabirol a neo-platonic universe dependent on the Will of the First Agent, it is not quite appropriate to consider that Agent as Yahweh, in a truly Jewish sense. There are more Christian than Jewish delights savored in this treatise by the Christians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

After an introduction, in which the author explains that the Fons Vitae is the first part of wisdom or more accurately the first foundation and root of wisdom, he elaborates the steps to be followed from a knowledge of matter and form through the knowledge of will to the science of the First Essence. This is wisdom: to know the First Essence. The total universe of man's knowledge includes the "per se nota" and what can be proved by the rules of the dialectical art. Employing such rules he established the existence of matter and form, their combinations and implications. The cause of all things is the Prime Essence and Will is the medium between it and all these hylomorphically constituted things.

At first glance one may be apt to place Gabirol's understanding of matter and form in the Christian-Aristotelian tradition. Yet, on the surface, at least, there seem to be basic differences. One of these is the equation of the form of man with "the composition of his members" and another is the designation of body as a combination of matter, or hyle, and quantity in such a way that quantity is the first form, that is 'corporeitas.' Unlike Avicenna and later Christian universal hylomorphists he does not speak of a form of corporeity but only of a "matter of corporeity"; corporeity or quantity is the basic corporeal form. "Forma quantitatis cum coniungitur materiae inferiori constituit speciem corporis et eam ducit ad esse." (II. 8.) The composite corporeal substance is either the corporeal matter supporting the forms of qualities by means of quantity (Tract I) or spiritual matter which sustains the corporeal form (Tract II). Simple spiritual substances are shown to exist in the accompanying selection (Tract III); the way of understanding matter and form in simple substances (Tract IV) and universal matter and form (Tract V) rounds out the complete work.

There is a general method to be followed in this investigation: if you know that there are properties of something and know what they are, then you know the existence of the thing which has these properties. If there is one universal matter for all things it will have the following properties: it is "per se existens," "unius essentiae," "sustinens diversitatem," and "dans omnibus essentiam suam et nomen." Such properties are found in things and hence there is one universal matter. If you abstract all forms, sensible and intelligible, the remainder is universal matter. And the process is to go from color to figure, to corporeity, to substantiality, to "intellectus spirituales." Created being supporting all these forms is universal matter. The properties of universal form are: "subsistere in alio," "perficere essentiam illius in quo est," "dare ei esse."

The particular method is to inspect natural sensibles both universal and particular and you will find matter and form. To the four modes of matter: artificial-particular matter, natural-particular matter, natural-universal matter and celestial matter, there correspond four grades of forms. Sensible body is known or perceived by the sensible qualities adhering in it. This sensible body is understood in terms of substance when viewed with the forms; when conceived as receptive of these forms it is designated as matter or hyle. These sensible forms require an extended subject which is the body, composed of matter and corporeity (i.e., quantity) . When the first form is added to the highest matter it constitutes the species of an intelligence. The form of the intelligence is a simple one whereas the form of quantity is many complex units. Of all forms, the former is the closest form to the highest matter, the latter is closest to the lowest matter. The form of the intelligence is not separated from the highest matter and quantity is not separated from the lowest. Each penetrates the total essence of its corresponding matter and supports all other appropriate forms.

It would be quite fascinating to conjecture about the antecedents of the basic ideas found in the Fons Vitae. With the sole exception of Plato there is no author mentioned by name throughout the whole five books. And even the references to Plato are quite vague and undeveloped. Because of certain anonymous references such as "it is said," "They have described," "why does one say," "I have often heard it said," "philosophers are accustomed to say," it may not be out of order to postulate that he considered his teaching within the generally accepted framework of Arabian-neo-platonism current at the time. Similar key ideas are found in the Karaitic writings of the tenth century under Mutazalite influences. He may be trying to reconcile the Arabian atomism and neoplatonic hylomorphism with a First Cause responsible for all because of Will, yet keeping that idea well within the Kalamite tradition. Such influences may have come through the Brethren of the Purity, who are generally conceded to have tried their hands at such typical neo-platonic attempts at unification. There are certain recognizable ideas of Avicenna, especially in regard to quantity and matter in itself. Though emanationism is a common neo-platonic explanation for the derivation of the many from the one, the intermediary of Will may be a somewhat later Sufi influence. Through the intermediary of Will, which is the divine power making matter and form and binding them together within the highest beings even down to the lowest, there flow from the First Essence the universal intelligence, souls, nature, the four elements and the particular corporeal beings of our experience.

The excerpt from the Fons Vitae presented here in English for the first time is taken from the third and middle tractate. Its primary purpose is to establish the existence of simple substances between the corporeal things of our experience and the First Agent or Author of all. Two methods are utilized: one is to consider the properties of the First Agent and the properties of the substance that supports the nine categories; the other is to examine the effects produced in the latter substance in accord with the general emanation of all from the First Author. The first really establishes the existence of simple substances; the second leads, synthetically and analytically, to a knowledge of what they are in themselves and how they are and why. Solomon Ibn Gabirol presents the complete integration of the simple substances into the overall pattern of universal hylomorphism. Here we have a very thorough cosmogony, cosmology, psychology and metaphysics.

Theodore E. James

Manhattan College

Part I

Pupil: What is the problem that we are now to discuss in this book?

Master: Since it is our intention to find the matter and the form in simple substances, and since you question the existence of simple substances, we must first consider — and that is the purpose of this book — the proof of the existence of simple substances. We shall seek assured certainty in this regard to the point of establishing their existence by necessary proofs. Next we shall proceed to an examination of the science of matter and form in simple substances.

Let us begin then by producing the proofs that establish the existence of a substance intermediary between the First Author, sublime and holy, and the substance that supports the nine categories. In this connection we shall postulate the following fundamental principle: If the origin of beings is the First Author, who is not caused, and the end of beings is the final effect, that itself has no effect, then the beginning of things is essentially and actually different from their end. For if the beginning of things is not distinct from their end, then the beginning is the end, and the end is the beginning.

Pupil: What is the nature of the distinction between the First Author, sublime and holy, and the final effect?

Master: By the distinction between them, we understand the removal of resemblance and similitude; and with the removal of resemblance and similitude, union or harmony is removed, for there is harmony only through resemblance.

Pupil: How can it be asserted with truth that between the First Author and the substance that supports the nine categories there exist intermediary substances that are nearer to the First Author than this substance, while all things are distinct from him and none of them is more worthy of being near him than another?

Master: Why do you not set intermediary substances uninterruptedly after the First Author, holy and sublime, just as you placed the substance that supports the nine categories uninterruptedly after him; particularly when these substances are simple and spiritual?

Pupil: Proof of the existence of simple substances is very difficult. Demonstrate therefore the proofs that establish the existence of a substance intermediary between the First Author and the final effect.

Master: I shall expound for you various proofs of the existence of intermediary substances, each of which will prove the existence of simple substances. But I do not guarantee to demonstrate them in an order, because that would be of little value; and also you are to make an effort to arrange and join them properly one with the other. Remember then every term of their premises and observe the arrangements of terms in accordance with the rules of logic: then you will realize the truth of the conclusions that follow from these premises.

The First Author is the origin of all things. And the origin of things is different from their end. And the substance that supports the nine categories is the end of things. Therefore the First Author is different from the substance that supports the nine categories.

I shall now take this conclusion as a premise and I assert: The First Author differs from the substance that supports the nine categories. Now all different things have an intermediary. Therefore there is an intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the nine categories.

Pupil: What proof is there that there is an intermediary between all different things?

Master: If there were, between different things, no intermediary except themselves, they would then be a single thing and would not be different.

Pupil: Although the First Author is different from the substance that supports the nine categories, it is however not necessary that there should be an intermediary between them, for the soul is different from the body without an intermediary between them.

Master: But for the spirit that is intermediary between the soul and the body, they would not be united together. If then the First Author were different from the substance that supports the nine categories without any intermediary between them, they could not be united: and if they did not unite, the substance would not exist for a single instant.

Every substance is simple or compound. But everything simple is anterior to the compound because the simple is the cause of the compound. Now the substance that supports the nine categories is compound. Hence the simple substance is anterior to it.

Every compound is composed of its simple elements. But everything composed of its simple elements is posterior to the simple elements of which it is composed. Now the substance that supports the nine categories is composed of its simple elements. Hence this substance must be posterior to the simple elements of which it is composed.

The First Author is the true unity in whom there is no multiplicity; and the substance that supports the nine categories is the utmost multiplicity after which there is no greater multiplicity than itself. Now every compound multitude can be reduced to one. It is therefore necessary that there should be intermediaries between the true unity and the compound multitude.

It is necessary that the multitude that is in the substance that supports the nine categories should be subordinate to a unity belonging to the same genus as itself. Now the true unity is not of the same genus as itself. Therefore this multitude is not subordinate immediately to the true unity.

Every author makes only things that resemble him. Now the simple substance is like the First Author. Therefore the effect of the First Author is nothing but the simple substance.

The substance that supports the nine categories is multiple. Now everything multiple is an aggregate of numerous units. Therefore the substance that supports the nine categories is an aggregate of many units. What is less multiflex is always prior to every aggregate of many units. Therefore the other substance, which is of less complexity, is prior to the substance that supports the nine categories.

Before every aggregate that is the result of duplication, there must necessarily be multiples of two until numerical unity is reached. Now the substance that supports the nine categories is an aggregate resulting from duplication. Therefore there must be prior to it substances resulting from duplication, until one substance is reached.

The more a substance descends, the more it becomes multiple; and, on the other hand, the more it ascends, the more unified it becomes. Now whatever becomes multiple in declining and unified in rising necessarily reaches true unity. Therefore it is necessary that a multiple substance reach the substance truly unified.

The substance that supports the categories is a species with differences, properties, and accidents. Now every species differs from other species comprised in the same genus that it has in common with them. Therefore the substance that supports the categories differs from other species comprised in the same genus that it has in common with this species.

The order of the small world is the image of that of the great world. Now the substance of the intelligence, that is simpler and nobler than all the substances of the small world, is not conjoined to the body, for the soul and the spirit are intermediaries between them. And since the order of the great world is concluded from this, it follows that the simplest and most noble substance is not conjoined to the body, which is the substance that supports the categories.

If there is no intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories, it is necessary that the First Author should be the author of the substance by himself. Now if the First Author is the author by himself of the substance, this substance has always been with God. But this substance has not always been. Therefore it was not made by the essence of the First Author. Therefore the First Author is not the author by himself of the substance. And since the First Author is not its author by himself, there must necessarily be an intermediary between them. But if any one denies that there is an intermediary between them, the converse of this proposition must necessarily be true: that is, if there is no intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories, the Author is not the author by himself of the substance. But we have already declared that, if there is no intermediary between the First Author and the substance, he must necessarily be the author by himself. Hence he is not himself the author and he is at the same time the author: which is impossible.

It is necessary for the corporeal substance to move in a thing that comprises it and is conjoined to it. But the First Author does not comprise anything and is not conjoined to anything. Therefore the substance that has categories does not move in the First Author.

The motion of the substance that supports the categories exists in time. Now time falls under sempiternity. Therefore the substance that supports the categories falls under sempiternity. Now the First Author is above sempiternity. Therefore sempiternity is the intermediary between himself and substance. But sempiternity is sempiternity for an eternal thing and duration for a thing in duration. Therefore there is something intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories, whose eternity is duration. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is not conjoined to the First Author.

It is necessary that the power or the substance that moves the substance supporting the categories should be conjoined and mingled with it. Now the First Author is neither conjoined to anything nor mingled with it. Therefore the power or substance that moves the substance supporting the categories is not of the essence of the First Author. And since this power or substance does not belong to his essence, there must necessarily be another substance that is intermediary that gives motion to the substance that supports the categories.

Motion in place comes from the soul. But the substance that supports the categories moves by motion in place. Therefore the motion of this substance comes from the soul.

The act of the First Author is the creation of something from nothing. Now the substance that supports the categories is composed of its simple elements. Therefore it is not created from nothing.

Between two contrary terms there is always an intermediary, that is similar to each term. But the First Author is contrary to the substance that supports the categories, for the First Author is the author only, while the substance that supports the categories is the effect only. Therefore there must necessarily be an intermediary between them, that is both cause and effect.

To every being a different thing corresponds, that is its contrary. Now the substance that supports the categories is slow in motion, because its motion is in time. Therefore there must be another substance of greater velocity, whose motion is not in time; and this is the substance that is intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories.

The substance supporting the categories is of finite power; and this power comes either from the essence of the substance, or from elsewhere. But it is not possible that this power should come from the essence of the substance, since the substance is moved by another thing. And if this power does not come from the essence of the substance, it comes to it either from the essence of the First Author, or from an intermediary between them. But this power does not come from the essence of the First Author, for it would then be necessary for the essence of the First Author to be divided, since a finite power would come from it. But since an infinite thing is not divisible, the power that is in the substance supporting the categories cannot come from the essence of the First Author. Hence it was necessary that there should be another principle that is intermediary between them. And let no one object that the power of the intermediate substance is infinite: because, although the power of this substance is infinite according to its simplicity, yet it is finite because it is a created substance. It is therefore necessary for the intermediary substance to be finite, because it is created. Now its creator is infinite. Therefore, just as they differ in action and passion, so too they differ in being finite and infinite.

The substance supporting the categories is formed. Now every being formed is formed according to a model. Therefore the substance supporting the categories is formed according to a model. I shall now postulate this proposition and I shall assert: The substance supporting the categories is formed according to a model. Now in all cases where a thing is formed according to a model, the model is anterior to it. Therefore the model according to which the substance is formed is anterior to it. Now the model of a substance is a substance. Therefore the substance-model is anterior to the substance formed by it. Therefore a substance exists that is anterior to the substance supporting the categories.

Every substance intermediate between two substances touches them. Now the substance of the soul touches the substance of the intelligence and the substance supporting the categories is touched by it. Therefore the substance of the soul is intermediary between the substance of the intelligence and the substance supporting the categories.

Simple substances, like the soul and the intelligence, are forms of compound substances. But every form comprises the thing formed. Therefore simple substances comprise compound substances. Now the substance supporting the categories is compound. Therefore the simple substances comprise it. The higher a being is raised, the more it resembles the form. Therefore the superior must be the form of the inferior. Now the simple substance is superior to the compound substance. Therefore the simple substance is the form of the compound substance. Now the substance supporting the categories is compound. Therefore the simple substance is the form of the substance supporting the categories. The soul and the intelligence are simple substances. Now every simple substance comprises a compound substance. Therefore the soul and the intelligence comprise the substance supporting the categories. Now all that comprises another thing is superior to that which is comprised. Therefore the soul and the intelligence are superior to the substance supporting the categories.

The substance supporting the categories is a compound. Now between the compound and the simple there is no intermediary. Therefore there is no intermediary between the substance supporting the categories and the simple substance. Now whatever thing does not have an intermediary between itself and another thing, follows it in sequence. Therefore the substance supporting the categories follows the simple substance in sequence.

It is necessary that the First Author should accomplish his task beyond duration. Now when an author accomplishes his task beyond duration, it is necessary that what suffers his action without an intermediary should be accomplished in suffering it beyond duration. Therefore it is necessary that what suffers the action of the First Author without an intermediary should be accomplished in suffering it beyond duration. To this conclusion this minor premise is added: Now the substance supporting the categories is not accomplished beyond duration, for the motion of this substance is in time. It is therefore necessary that the substance supporting the categories should not suffer the action of the First Author without an intermediary.

It is necessary that every thing that suffers should suffer in action. Now all that suffers in action must necessarily receive the power of acting. Therefore it is necessary that all that suffers should receive the power of acting. After this conclusion, I postulate: It is necessary that what suffers immediately the action of the First Author should receive the power of acting. Now that which receives the power of acting, acts. Therefore it is necessary that what suffers immediately the action of the First Author, acts. And to this conclusion is added the following proposition: The substance supporting the categories does not act. Therefore this substance does not immediately suffer the action of the First Author.

The substance supporting the categories is mobile. Now everything mobile suffers. Therefore the substance with categories suffers. And every passion passes from potency to act. Therefore the passion of the substance supporting the categories passes from potency to act. I postulate this conclusion and say: The passion of the substance supporting the categories passes from potency to act. Now whenever a thing passes from potency to act, it is a being in action that attracts it into action. Therefore the passion of a substance supporting the categories attracts from potency to act only what exists in action without there being an intermediary between the substance and itself.