Manhattan College

Part I

Pupil: What is the problem that we are now to discuss in this book?

Master: Since it is our intention to find the matter and the form in simple substances, and since you question the existence of simple substances, we must first consider — and that is the purpose of this book — the proof of the existence of simple substances. We shall seek assured certainty in this regard to the point of establishing their existence by necessary proofs. Next we shall proceed to an examination of the science of matter and form in simple substances.

Let us begin then by producing the proofs that establish the existence of a substance intermediary between the First Author, sublime and holy, and the substance that supports the nine categories. In this connection we shall postulate the following fundamental principle: If the origin of beings is the First Author, who is not caused, and the end of beings is the final effect, that itself has no effect, then the beginning of things is essentially and actually different from their end. For if the beginning of things is not distinct from their end, then the beginning is the end, and the end is the beginning.

Pupil: What is the nature of the distinction between the First Author, sublime and holy, and the final effect?

Master: By the distinction between them, we understand the removal of resemblance and similitude; and with the removal of resemblance and similitude, union or harmony is removed, for there is harmony only through resemblance.

Pupil: How can it be asserted with truth that between the First Author and the substance that supports the nine categories there exist intermediary substances that are nearer to the First Author than this substance, while all things are distinct from him and none of them is more worthy of being near him than another?

Master: Why do you not set intermediary substances uninterruptedly after the First Author, holy and sublime, just as you placed the substance that supports the nine categories uninterruptedly after him; particularly when these substances are simple and spiritual?

Pupil: Proof of the existence of simple substances is very difficult. Demonstrate therefore the proofs that establish the existence of a substance intermediary between the First Author and the final effect.

Master: I shall expound for you various proofs of the existence of intermediary substances, each of which will prove the existence of simple substances. But I do not guarantee to demonstrate them in an order, because that would be of little value; and also you are to make an effort to arrange and join them properly one with the other. Remember then every term of their premises and observe the arrangements of terms in accordance with the rules of logic: then you will realize the truth of the conclusions that follow from these premises.

The First Author is the origin of all things. And the origin of things is different from their end. And the substance that supports the nine categories is the end of things. Therefore the First Author is different from the substance that supports the nine categories.

I shall now take this conclusion as a premise and I assert: The First Author differs from the substance that supports the nine categories. Now all different things have an intermediary. Therefore there is an intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the nine categories.

Pupil: What proof is there that there is an intermediary between all different things?

Master: If there were, between different things, no intermediary except themselves, they would then be a single thing and would not be different.

Pupil: Although the First Author is different from the substance that supports the nine categories, it is however not necessary that there should be an intermediary between them, for the soul is different from the body without an intermediary between them.

Master: But for the spirit that is intermediary between the soul and the body, they would not be united together. If then the First Author were different from the substance that supports the nine categories without any intermediary between them, they could not be united: and if they did not unite, the substance would not exist for a single instant.

Every substance is simple or compound. But everything simple is anterior to the compound because the simple is the cause of the compound. Now the substance that supports the nine categories is compound. Hence the simple substance is anterior to it.

Every compound is composed of its simple elements. But everything composed of its simple elements is posterior to the simple elements of which it is composed. Now the substance that supports the nine categories is composed of its simple elements. Hence this substance must be posterior to the simple elements of which it is composed.

The First Author is the true unity in whom there is no multiplicity; and the substance that supports the nine categories is the utmost multiplicity after which there is no greater multiplicity than itself. Now every compound multitude can be reduced to one. It is therefore necessary that there should be intermediaries between the true unity and the compound multitude.

It is necessary that the multitude that is in the substance that supports the nine categories should be subordinate to a unity belonging to the same genus as itself. Now the true unity is not of the same genus as itself. Therefore this multitude is not subordinate immediately to the true unity.

Every author makes only things that resemble him. Now the simple substance is like the First Author. Therefore the effect of the First Author is nothing but the simple substance.

The substance that supports the nine categories is multiple. Now everything multiple is an aggregate of numerous units. Therefore the substance that supports the nine categories is an aggregate of many units. What is less multiflex is always prior to every aggregate of many units. Therefore the other substance, which is of less complexity, is prior to the substance that supports the nine categories.

Before every aggregate that is the result of duplication, there must necessarily be multiples of two until numerical unity is reached. Now the substance that supports the nine categories is an aggregate resulting from duplication. Therefore there must be prior to it substances resulting from duplication, until one substance is reached.

The more a substance descends, the more it becomes multiple; and, on the other hand, the more it ascends, the more unified it becomes. Now whatever becomes multiple in declining and unified in rising necessarily reaches true unity. Therefore it is necessary that a multiple substance reach the substance truly unified.

The substance that supports the categories is a species with differences, properties, and accidents. Now every species differs from other species comprised in the same genus that it has in common with them. Therefore the substance that supports the categories differs from other species comprised in the same genus that it has in common with this species.

The order of the small world is the image of that of the great world. Now the substance of the intelligence, that is simpler and nobler than all the substances of the small world, is not conjoined to the body, for the soul and the spirit are intermediaries between them. And since the order of the great world is concluded from this, it follows that the simplest and most noble substance is not conjoined to the body, which is the substance that supports the categories.

If there is no intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories, it is necessary that the First Author should be the author of the substance by himself. Now if the First Author is the author by himself of the substance, this substance has always been with God. But this substance has not always been. Therefore it was not made by the essence of the First Author. Therefore the First Author is not the author by himself of the substance. And since the First Author is not its author by himself, there must necessarily be an intermediary between them. But if any one denies that there is an intermediary between them, the converse of this proposition must necessarily be true: that is, if there is no intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories, the Author is not the author by himself of the substance. But we have already declared that, if there is no intermediary between the First Author and the substance, he must necessarily be the author by himself. Hence he is not himself the author and he is at the same time the author: which is impossible.

It is necessary for the corporeal substance to move in a thing that comprises it and is conjoined to it. But the First Author does not comprise anything and is not conjoined to anything. Therefore the substance that has categories does not move in the First Author.

The motion of the substance that supports the categories exists in time. Now time falls under sempiternity. Therefore the substance that supports the categories falls under sempiternity. Now the First Author is above sempiternity. Therefore sempiternity is the intermediary between himself and substance. But sempiternity is sempiternity for an eternal thing and duration for a thing in duration. Therefore there is something intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories, whose eternity is duration. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is not conjoined to the First Author.

It is necessary that the power or the substance that moves the substance supporting the categories should be conjoined and mingled with it. Now the First Author is neither conjoined to anything nor mingled with it. Therefore the power or substance that moves the substance supporting the categories is not of the essence of the First Author. And since this power or substance does not belong to his essence, there must necessarily be another substance that is intermediary that gives motion to the substance that supports the categories.

Motion in place comes from the soul. But the substance that supports the categories moves by motion in place. Therefore the motion of this substance comes from the soul.

The act of the First Author is the creation of something from nothing. Now the substance that supports the categories is composed of its simple elements. Therefore it is not created from nothing.

Between two contrary terms there is always an intermediary, that is similar to each term. But the First Author is contrary to the substance that supports the categories, for the First Author is the author only, while the substance that supports the categories is the effect only. Therefore there must necessarily be an intermediary between them, that is both cause and effect.

To every being a different thing corresponds, that is its contrary. Now the substance that supports the categories is slow in motion, because its motion is in time. Therefore there must be another substance of greater velocity, whose motion is not in time; and this is the substance that is intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories.

The substance supporting the categories is of finite power; and this power comes either from the essence of the substance, or from elsewhere. But it is not possible that this power should come from the essence of the substance, since the substance is moved by another thing. And if this power does not come from the essence of the substance, it comes to it either from the essence of the First Author, or from an intermediary between them. But this power does not come from the essence of the First Author, for it would then be necessary for the essence of the First Author to be divided, since a finite power would come from it. But since an infinite thing is not divisible, the power that is in the substance supporting the categories cannot come from the essence of the First Author. Hence it was necessary that there should be another principle that is intermediary between them. And let no one object that the power of the intermediate substance is infinite: because, although the power of this substance is infinite according to its simplicity, yet it is finite because it is a created substance. It is therefore necessary for the intermediary substance to be finite, because it is created. Now its creator is infinite. Therefore, just as they differ in action and passion, so too they differ in being finite and infinite.

The substance supporting the categories is formed. Now every being formed is formed according to a model. Therefore the substance supporting the categories is formed according to a model. I shall now postulate this proposition and I shall assert: The substance supporting the categories is formed according to a model. Now in all cases where a thing is formed according to a model, the model is anterior to it. Therefore the model according to which the substance is formed is anterior to it. Now the model of a substance is a substance. Therefore the substance-model is anterior to the substance formed by it. Therefore a substance exists that is anterior to the substance supporting the categories.

Every substance intermediate between two substances touches them. Now the substance of the soul touches the substance of the intelligence and the substance supporting the categories is touched by it. Therefore the substance of the soul is intermediary between the substance of the intelligence and the substance supporting the categories.

Simple substances, like the soul and the intelligence, are forms of compound substances. But every form comprises the thing formed. Therefore simple substances comprise compound substances. Now the substance supporting the categories is compound. Therefore the simple substances comprise it. The higher a being is raised, the more it resembles the form. Therefore the superior must be the form of the inferior. Now the simple substance is superior to the compound substance. Therefore the simple substance is the form of the compound substance. Now the substance supporting the categories is compound. Therefore the simple substance is the form of the substance supporting the categories. The soul and the intelligence are simple substances. Now every simple substance comprises a compound substance. Therefore the soul and the intelligence comprise the substance supporting the categories. Now all that comprises another thing is superior to that which is comprised. Therefore the soul and the intelligence are superior to the substance supporting the categories.

The substance supporting the categories is a compound. Now between the compound and the simple there is no intermediary. Therefore there is no intermediary between the substance supporting the categories and the simple substance. Now whatever thing does not have an intermediary between itself and another thing, follows it in sequence. Therefore the substance supporting the categories follows the simple substance in sequence.

It is necessary that the First Author should accomplish his task beyond duration. Now when an author accomplishes his task beyond duration, it is necessary that what suffers his action without an intermediary should be accomplished in suffering it beyond duration. Therefore it is necessary that what suffers the action of the First Author without an intermediary should be accomplished in suffering it beyond duration. To this conclusion this minor premise is added: Now the substance supporting the categories is not accomplished beyond duration, for the motion of this substance is in time. It is therefore necessary that the substance supporting the categories should not suffer the action of the First Author without an intermediary.

It is necessary that every thing that suffers should suffer in action. Now all that suffers in action must necessarily receive the power of acting. Therefore it is necessary that all that suffers should receive the power of acting. After this conclusion, I postulate: It is necessary that what suffers immediately the action of the First Author should receive the power of acting. Now that which receives the power of acting, acts. Therefore it is necessary that what suffers immediately the action of the First Author, acts. And to this conclusion is added the following proposition: The substance supporting the categories does not act. Therefore this substance does not immediately suffer the action of the First Author.

The substance supporting the categories is mobile. Now everything mobile suffers. Therefore the substance with categories suffers. And every passion passes from potency to act. Therefore the passion of the substance supporting the categories passes from potency to act. I postulate this conclusion and say: The passion of the substance supporting the categories passes from potency to act. Now whenever a thing passes from potency to act, it is a being in action that attracts it into action. Therefore the passion of a substance supporting the categories attracts from potency to act only what exists in action without there being an intermediary between the substance and itself.

Similarly I take this conclusion as a premise and assert: The passion of the substance supporting the categories passes from potency to act by virtue of a being in action without there being an intermediary between them. Now the First Author is neither in power nor in action. Therefore the passion of the substance supporting the categories does not pass from power to act by virtue of the First Author without an intermediary between them.

The soul moves by itself beyond place. Now whatever is mobile by itself beyond place has a uniform motion. Therefore the soul moves by a uniform motion. I take this conclusion as a premise and I assert: The soul moves with a uniform motion. Now after every uniform motion comes a secondary thing. Therefore the uniform motion of the soul is followed by a secondary motion.

And according to another method: If the mind were by itself the first mobile, and the first motion were uniform, it is necessary that the motion of the soul should be a uniform motion. That the uniform motion is the first motion, is proved from this fact, that if uniform motion does not exist, secondary motion does not exist, nor the other motions. And as the soul in itself is the first mobile, it moves then with a uniform motion. I shall make this conclusion a premise and I assert: If the soul, which is in itself the first mobile, moves with a uniform motion, it is necessary that the mobile that follows move with a secondary motion. Therefore the mobile that follows moves with a secondary motion. But the soul, that is in itself the first mobile, moves with a uniform motion. Therefore the mobile that follows moves with a secondary motion. I shall treat this conclusion as a premise and I assert: The uniform motion of the soul is followed by a varied motion. Now the substance supporting the categories moves with a varied motion, for each part of this substance moves in two places only; because it moves from the first position to the second, from the second to the third: thus the second and the third are like the first and the second, and so on until the last of the positions. Since the uniform motion of the soul is followed by a secondary motion and the substance supporting the categories moves with a varied motion, the uniform motion of the soul is followed by the motion of the substance supporting the categories.

Similarly in another way: The substance supporting the categories moves with a secondary motion. Now all that moves with a secondary motion follows in sequence that which moves with a uniform motion. Hence the substances supporting the categories follow in sequence the substance that moves with a uniform motion. Likewise I take this proposition and I assert: The substance supporting the categories follows in sequence the substance that moves with a uniform motion. Now the soul moves with a uniform motion. Therefore the substance supporting the categories follows in sequence the substance of the soul.

Likewise in another way: If the secondary motion by which the substance that supports the categories is moved returns to the uniform motion, it is necessary that the motion of this substance should follow the uniform motion of the soul. But the secondary motion by which the substance that supports the categories is moved returns to the uniform motion, for each part of this mobile substance returns to the position from which it moved and then the motion of this substance is unified. Therefore the motion of the substance that supports the categories follows the uniform motion of the soul. Similarly I take this conclusion as a premise and I assert: If the motion of the substance that supports the categories follows the motion of the soul, it is necessary that the substance that supports the categories should follow the motion of the soul. Hence it is also necessary that the substance that supports the categories should follow the substance of the soul: that is, there is no intermediary between motion and substance. Now the motion of the substance that supports the categories follows the motion of the soul. Therefore it is necessary that the substance that supports the categories should follow the substance of the soul.

Whatever the being is that, in its entirety, receives something from another without an intermediary, it is more ready to receive it than if it received it with an intermediary. Therefore a whole that receives a thing without one of its parts receiving it more than another of its parts does, receives this thing that it receives without an intermediary more than with an intermediary.

The proof of this conclusion is demonstrated through the conversion of the negative proposition: whatever the whole is that receives something from another thing without an intermediary, there is no part of it that receives it more than another of its parts does. And the converse of this proposition is as follows: Whatever the whole is that receives a thing without one of its parts receiving it more than another of its parts, it receives it without an intermediary. To this proposition we add the following universal affirmative: A whole that receives something from another thing without an intermediary receives it more than if it received it with an intermediary. Therefore whatever the being that receives something without one of its parts receiving it more than another of its parts, it receives it more without an intermediary than if it received it with an intermediary.

Then we shall pose this affirmative: A substance is so constituted that one of its parts receives more motion than another. I shall add a negative and the following syllogism appears: A substance is so constituted that one of its parts receives the form more than another. Now a whole that receives something without one of its parts receiving it more than another, receives it more than if it received it with an intermediary. Therefore the substance does not receive the form more than if it received it with an intermediary.

Next we shall propose this universal: Whatever receives something without an intermediary receives it more than if it received it with an intermediary. To this I add the negative: A substance does not receive the form more than if it received it with an intermediary: and the following syllogism arises: Whatever receives something without an intermediary receives it more than if it received it with an intermediary. Now a substance does not receive the form more than if it received it with an intermediary. Therefore the substance does not receive the form without an intermediary.

The proof of this conclusion is demonstrated by the conversion of the following affirmative proposition: Whatever receives something without an intermediary receives it more than if it received it with an intermediary. The converse of this proposition is as follows: Whatever receives something without an intermediary more than with an intermediary receives it without an intermediary. The following syllogism takes places: The substance does not receive the form more than if it received it with an intermediary. Now whatever receives something without an intermediary more than with an intermediary receives it without an intermediary. Therefore the substance does not receive the form without an intermediary.

Similarly in another way. The substance that supports the categories is so constituted that one of its parts receives the form more than another. Now a whole that receives something and a part of which receives it more than another of its parts does not receive this thing without some intermediary. Therefore the substance that supports the categories has no form without some intermediary.

If all beings have their contraries and if the substance that supports the categories is a force that receives its own form, it is necessary that there should be a force contrary to it that receives all forms. And this is the property of simple substances.

If the common root of beings is constituted in contrary terms, it is necessary that all beings comprised in this root should constitute contrary terms. Now the root of beings is constituted of contrary terms, for it bears and is borne. It is therefore necessary that all beings dependent on this root should constitute contrary terms.

If there exists a compound substance, it is necessary that there should exist a simple substance contrary to it. Now the compound substance exists. Therefore the simple substance also exists. And if the simple substance exists, it is either above the compound substance or below it. If the simple substance is below the compound substance, then the simple substance is created by the compound substance. But the compound substance is created by the simple substance. Therefore the simple substance is not below the compound substance. And since it is not below it, it must necessarily be above it. Hence the following syllogism: A simple substance is above a compound substance. Now the substance that supports the categories is compound. Therefore a simple substance is above a substance that supports the categories.

A simple substance and a compound substance are united without loss of any of their forms. Now all things that are united without loss of any of their forms are in harmony. Therefore the simple substance and the compound substance are in harmony. And all things that are in agreement are of the same genus. Therefore the simple substance and the compound substance are of the same genus. Now all things that are of the same genus fall under what is their genus. Therefore the simple substance and the compound substance fall under the same genus. Therefore there is a substance above them, more simple than they and common to them.

If the First Author is the author beyond time, it is necessary that the first being to suffer his action should suffer it beyond time. But the First Author acts beyond time. Therefore the first being to suffer his action must suffer it beyond time. I take this conclusion and I assert: It is necessary that the first being to suffer his action should suffer it beyond time. Now the substance that supports the categories does not suffer beyond time. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is not the first object of the action of the First Author.

It is necessary that everything that suffers should suffer in time or beyond time. Let us first postulate the following principle: Everything that suffers beyond time is anterior to that which suffers in time. And let us take the converse to this proposition: All that is anterior to that which suffers in time itself suffers beyond time. And we shall add this minor premise: Whenever a being suffers beyond time, there does not exist anything else that suffers anterior to it. Therefore whenever a being is anterior to that which suffers in time, there exists no other sufferer anterior to it.

Let us postulate this second principle: All that suffers in time, is posterior to that which suffers beyond time. Let us take the converse of this proposition, namely: All that is posterior to that which suffers beyond time, suffers in time. And let us add this second proposition: Whenever a thing suffers in time, there exists no other sufferer posterior to it. Therefore after that which is posterior to that which suffers beyond time, there exists no other sufferer posterior to it.

And to this conclusion we shall add another proposition: The substance that supports the categories suffers in time. And all that suffers in time is posterior to that which suffers beyond time. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is posterior to that which suffers beyond time. And to this conclusion I shall add the first conclusion: Whenever a being is posterior to that which suffers beyond time, there does not exist another sufferer posterior to it. Therefore after the substance that supports the categories there does not exist any other sufferer.

Similarly in another way and in a concise manner: A simple substance suffers beyond time, and a compound substance suffers in time. But there is no other being that suffers anterior to that which suffers beyond time, and there is no other being that suffers posterior to that which suffers in time. Therefore there does not exist any other being that suffers anterior to the simple substance; nor any other being that suffers posterior to the compound substance that supports the categories.

All that moves perpetually with a local motion is separated from the past motion and is prepared for the future motion. Now all that is separated from one thing and approaches another, passes from potency to act. Similarly I shall say next: The substance that supports the categories moves perpetually with a local motion. Now all that moves perpetually with a local motion proceeds from potentiality to act. Therefore the substance that supports the categories proceeds from potentiality to act. Now all that proceeds from potentiality to act is not perfect. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is not perfect. I shall then say: If some author is perfect, the immediate object of his action is perfect. But the First Author is perfect. Therefore the immediate object of his action is perfect. I take this conclusion as a premise and say: The immediate object of the action of the First Author is perfect. But the substance that supports the categories is not perfect. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is not the immediate object of the action of the First Author.

The forms subsisting in the substance that supports the categories proceed from potentiality to act. Now whatever passes somewhere from potentiality to act draws along nothing except that which exists in act, and the first thing is the second in potentiality. Therefore the forms subsisting in the substance that supports the categories pass from potentiality to act only through other forms that exist in act, and the first forms are the second in potentiality. Let us take this conclusion as a premise, and add the following proposition: The essence of the First Author has no form. Therefore the forms subsisting in the substance that supports the categories do not pass from potentiality to act by the essence of the First Author.

Whenever anything receives something from another without an intermediary, nothing more worthy than it can be found to receive this thing. If the substance that supports the categories receives substantiality from the First Author without an intermediary, then no other substance can be found more worthy than it of the name of substance. But the simple substance, like the soul and the intelligence, is more worthy of the name of substance than the substance that supports the categories. Therefore the substance that supports the categories does not receive substantiality immediately from the First Author.

The principle that moves without an intermediary the substance that supports the categories cannot be infinite for it must necessarily move it either of itself or by accident. And if it moves it by its essence, and its essence is infinite, it is not possible for the motion that proceeds from it to be finite. Now the motion of the substance is finite. Therefore the essence that moves it is not infinite. And if it moves it by accident, its essence is not infinite either, for all that is infinite does not receive any accident. And the proof of this is as follows: A thing that is infinite does not change. Now everything that receives accidents changes. Therefore an infinite thing does not receive any accident.

Therefore it is not possible for the immediate mover of the substance to be infinite. Therefore it is finite. We take this conclusion and assert: The immediate mover of the substance with categories is finite. Now the First Author is infinite. Therefore the First Author is not the immediate mover of the substance.

Part II

Similarly in another way. If the immediate mover of the substance is infinite, the motion of the substance is infinite. But it is impossible for the motion of the substance to be infinite, since its substance is finite. Therefore it is impossible for the immediate mover of this substance to be infinite. Next we shall add to this conclusion the following proposition: The First Author is infinite. Therefore it is impossible for the First Author to be the immediate mover of the substance.

The motion of the substance that supports the categories cannot but be either natural or voluntary. If it is natural, the First Author is not its immediate mover, for the First Author does not cause a natural effect without an intermediary. And if it is voluntary, and the substance in itself has no will, it is necessary for the substance to depend on another substance, that gives it a will to move. Now it is impossible that this substance should be the First Author, for the First Author is not mobile. Therefore this substance that gives motion to the substance that supports the categories is different from the First Author. Therefore the First Author is not the immediate mover of the substance.

The substance that moves the substance supporting the categories must be either mobile or immobile. If it is immobile, it cannot move the substance that supports the categories, for this substance either can move or cannot. If it can move, it would be mobile. If it cannot move in itself, it could not possibly move another thing.

The proof of the impossibility for the mover of the substance to be able to move it, since it cannot move itself, is as follows: Let us assume that that which moves the substance cannot move itself. Now everything that cannot move itself cannot move anything else. Therefore what we have assumed as the mover of the substance cannot move it. Therefore it is impossible for the mover of the substance to move it and not be mobile in itself. Therefore the mover of the substance is mobile.

And the proof that the mover of the substance that gives the substance the faculty of moving is mobile is demonstrated thus: The mover of the substance gives the substance the faculty of moving. Now whatever gives a thing to another thing is more worthy of possessing the thing given than that which receives it. Therefore the mover of the substance that gives the substance the faculty of moving is more worthy of possessing the faculty of moving than the substance that receives it. Therefore the immediate mover of the substance is mobile. I take this conclusion and assert: The substance that moves the substance without an intermediary is mobile. Now the First Author is not mobile. Therefore the First Author is not the immediate mover of the substance.

The substance that supports the categories is a body. Now every body in itself is at rest. Therefore the substance that supports the categories in itself is at rest. Now everything that is at rest depends on a mobile end. Therefore the substance that supports the categories depends on a mobile end. Now all that depends on a mobile end has a mobile anterior to it. Therefore the substance that supports the categories has a mobile anterior to it. But everything mobile is substance. Therefore the substance that supports the categories has another mobile substance anterior to it.

The substance that is the object of the action by the First Author must be either mobile or immobile. Now it is impossible for it not to be mobile, for the First Author is a mover; and if the object of his action were not mobile, he himself would not be a mover. It is therefore necessary for the object of the action by the First Author to be mobile.

Hence it moves either in time or beyond time. Now it is impossible that it should be mobile in time, for its mover is a mover beyond time. This is the form of the argument: The first mover moves beyond time. Now what is moved by a mover beyond time is moved beyond time. Therefore that which is moved by the first mover moves beyond time. Now the substance that supports the categories does not move beyond time. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is not moved by the first mover.

It is necessary that if there exists something that moves in time, there should exist also something beyond time, for if nothing moved beyond time, the first mover would not be a mover beyond time, but he would move in time. Therefore the first mover would move in time and at the same time would move beyond time: which is impossible.

If the First Author is not mobile, it is necessary that the substance that he moves should be mobile beyond time, because if the substance were mobile in time, it would be necessary that there should exist anterior to it a mobile beyond time. But there is nothing anterior to it except the first mover. Therefore the first mover would move beyond time. But the first mover is not mobile in any manner. Therefore the substance that he moves does not move in time. Now we take this proposition and we assert: That which is moved by the first mover does not move in time. Now the substance that supports the categories moves in time. Therefore that which is moved by the first mover is not the substance that supports the categories.

The motion that is in the substance that supports the categories is variable. Now everything variable is passive. Therefore the motion that is in the substance that supports the categories is passive. But the essence of the First Author is not passive. Therefore the motion that is in the substance supporting the categories does not come from the essence of the First Author. Therefore it comes from the essence of another substance.

Everything by means of which something that is moved is passive will have a passive essence. Now the motion that is in the substance supporting the categories is passive. Therefore the substance that causes its motion is passive. Similarly, I assert: The substance that causes the motion of the substance supporting the categories is passive. Now the First Author is not passive. Therefore the First Author does not cause the motion of the substance supporting the categories.

The diffused motion in the substance supporting the categories must be either a substance or an accident. If it is an accident, its author is a substance; and this substance is either finite or infinite. Now it is impossible that it should be infinite, for it is conjoined to a finite substance. But if it is finite, it is not the First Author.

And if the motion is a substance, what is proper to the creative substance is proper to it, that is finiteness or infinitude. If it is finite, it is impossible that it should be the First Author. And if it is infinite, it cannot unite with a finite substance and cannot produce a finite work. Now the moving substance is united to a finite substance and produces a finite work, for all the motions that are found in the substance are finite. Therefore the substance that moves the substance supporting the categories is not infinite. Now the First Author is infinite. Therefore the substance that moves the substance supporting the categories is not the First Author.

All that moves in an infinite place cannot possibly traverse this place in a finite time. The substance that supports the categories traverses the place in which it moves in a finite time. Therefore the substance supporting the categories cannot possibly move in an infinite place. Then I postulate this proposition and assert: The substance supporting the categories does not move in an infinite place. Now the First Author is an infinite place. Therefore the substance supporting the categories does not move in the First Author.

Similarly in another way. The substance that supports the categories traverses the place in which it moves in a finite time. Now whenever a thing traverses the place in which it moves in a finite time, the place in which it moves is finite. Therefore the place in which the substance supporting the categories moves is finite. And when we add to this conclusion the affirmation that the First Author is not finite, the conclusion is that the place in which the substance that supports the categories moves is not the First Author.

The substance that supports the categories is finite. Now a finite substance cannot move in an infinite substance. Therefore the substance that supports the categories cannot possibly move in an infinite substance. To this conclusion I shall add this proposition: The First Author is infinite. Therefore the substance that supports the categories cannot possibly move in the First Author.

Every simple substance that unites by itself with another substance is finite; being terminated where it unites with the other substance. Now whenever a thing is terminated in another thing, its essence is finite. Therefore every simple substance that unites with another substance has a finite essence. I now take this proposition and assert as follows: Every simple substance that unites by itself with another substance has a finite essence. Now the essence of the First Author is infinite. Therefore the essence of the First Author is not united with any one of the simple finite substances. Similarly I take this conclusion and add the following proposition: The essence of the substance that supports the categories is finite. Therefore the essence of the First Author is not united to the substance that supports the categories. If between the essence of the First Author and the substance that supports the categories there were no intermediary, the essence of the First Author would be united to the substance that supports the categories. But the essence of the First Author is not united to the substance that supports the categories. Therefore between the essence of the First Author and the substance that supports the categories there is an intermediary.

Everything that is simple or compound and finite in essence is united to another thing only by its extremity. Now whenever a thing unites with another by its extremity, inversely the other thing unites with the first thing by its extremity. Therefore whenever a thing is of finite essence, whatever unites with it is finite; and everything that follows the finite that unites with it is of finite essence. Now the substance that supports the categories is of finite essence. Therefore the substance that follows it is of finite essence.

If the substance that supports the categories is created independently of another thing, there exists nothing else more perfect and stronger than it. Now there exists a substance more perfect and stronger than this one. Therefore this substance is not created independently by another thing.

Similarly in another way. If there exists a substance more perfect than the substance supporting the categories, then the substance supporting the categories proceeds from it. All that proceeds from another thing is posterior to the power from which it proceeds; and all that is posterior to some power is not so perfect as the principle of the power from which it proceeds. Therefore everything that proceeds from another thing is not so perfect as the principle of that from which it proceeds. Then I take this proposition and assert: All that proceeds from something else is not so perfect as the principle of that from which it proceeds. Now all that is not so perfect as the principle of that from which it proceeds is imperfect. Therefore all that proceeds from something else is imperfect. Similarly I take this proposition and assert: All that proceeds from something else is imperfect. Now to everything imperfect corresponds something more perfect. Therefore to everything that proceeds from something else corresponds something else more perfect than it.

Next I shall take the converse of this proposition: Everything to which a more perfect thing corresponds proceeds from something else. To this we add the following proposition: There exists another substance more perfect than the substance that supports the categories. Therefore the substance that supports the categories proceeds from something else. Similarly, from this point on: The substance that supports the categories proceeds from something else. Now all that proceeds from something else is of the same genus as that from which it proceeds. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is of the same genus as that from which it proceeds. Similarly from this point on: The substance that supports the categories is of the same genus as that from which it proceeds. Now the substance that supports the categories is a substance. Therefore that from which it proceeds is also a substance. Therefore this is the substance superior to the substance that supports the categories from which it proceeds.

The substance of the intelligence has every form. Now everything that has every form must be anterior to that which has only some forms and is more subtle than it. Therefore the substance of the intelligence is anterior to that which has only some forms and is more subtle than it. Then to this conclusion I shall add this proposition: The substance that supports the categories has some forms only. Therefore the substance of the intelligence is anterior to the substance that supports the categories and is more subtle than it.

The substance of intelligence suffers beyond time. Now everything that suffers beyond time is anterior to that which suffers in time and is more subtle than it. Therefore the substance of the intelligence is prior to that which suffers in time and is more subtle than it. To this conclusion I add the following proposition: The substance that supports the categories suffers in time. Therefore the substance of the intelligence is anterior to the substance that supports the categories and is more subtle than it.

If there existed a substance anterior to the substance that supports the categories and more subtle than it, the substance that supports the categories would not be the immediate object of the action of the First Author. But the substance of the intelligence is anterior to the substance that supports the categories and more subtle than it. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is not the immediate object of the action of the First Author. And the converse of this proposition: If the substance that supports the categories is the immediate object of the action of the First Author, there is no other substance more subtle than it and anterior to it. But the substance of the intelligence is anterior to it and is more subtle than it. Therefore it is not the immediate object of the action of the First Author.

The form that subsists in the substance that supports the categories is in it accidentally. Now what is in something accidentally is essentially in its cause. Therefore the form that subsists in the substance that supports the categories accidentally is essentially in its cause. Then I take this proposition and I assert: The form borne accidentally by the substance that supports the categories is essentially in its cause. Now whatever is essentially in its cause is a proper accident for its cause. Therefore the form borne by the substance that supports the categories is a proper accident for its cause. Then I take this proposition and I add another: There is no accident in the essence of the First Author. Therefore the form borne by the substance that supports the categories is not in the essence of the First Author. Then I take this proposition and I assert: The form borne by the substance that supports the categories is essentially in its cause. Therefore the First Author is not the essential cause of the form. Therefore there is another substance that is the essential cause of this form, and this form has existence in this substance through creation by the First Author.

The First Author is the origin of things. Now whatever is the origin of things has as a contrary the extremity of things. Therefore the First Author has an extremity that is contrary to him. Then I take this proposition and I add: The substance that supports the categories is the extremity of things. Therefore the substance that supports the categories is the extremity that is opposed to the First Author. Then I take this proposition and I add: Whenever there is a last term for a first term, there is an intermediary between them. Therefore between the substance that supports the categories and the First Author there is an intermediary.

Whatever begins to exist, before existence, is possible of existence. Now whatever is possible before existence is necessary after having been possible. Then I take this proposition and I assert: Whatever is possible before it existed is necessary after having been possible. Now whatever is necessary after having been possible has now passed from possibility to necessity. Therefore whatever is possible after not having existed has now passed from possibility to necessity. From this conclusion we draw what it has in potentiality and we say: The possibility of being that which did not exist changes into necessity. Now whatever changes into something is of the same genus as the thing into which it changes. Therefore the possibility is of the same genus as the necessity.

Next we assume the following observation and we assert: The substance that supports the categories presents in place parts that were not there previously; it is found to be draped in some form in which it had not previously been draped. Now whatever is after not having been, was possible. Therefore the substance supporting the categories is said to be possible. Similarly: The substance supporting the categories is said to be possible. Now all that is defined as possible must necessarily have something anterior to it that is defined by necessity, for necessity is anterior to possibility. Therefore the substance supporting the categories defined as possible must have anterior to it something defined by necessity. Similarly I take this proposition as a premise: The substance supporting the categories defined as possible must have anterior to it something that is defined by necessity. Now the possible and the necessary are of the same genus, as has been stated. Therefore the substance supporting the categories is of the same genus as the substance anterior to it.

Similarly in another way: The necessary substance is anterior to the possible substance. Now the substance that supports the categories is possible. Therefore the necessary substance is anterior to the substance that supports the categories. Similarly: The necessary substance is anterior to the substance that supports the categories. The necessary substance is of the same genus as the possible substance. Therefore the substance anterior to the substance supporting the categories is of the same genus as the possible substance. Now the substance supporting the categories is possible. Therefore the substance that is anterior to the substance supporting the categories is of the same genus as it.

We have now advanced all that it was possible to advance regarding the proofs to demonstrate that the substance supporting the categories is not moved by the First Author without an intermediary; and it is clear that there exists another substance intermediary between the First Author and the substance supporting the categories.

Pupil: Certainly the proofs that you have adduced are an excellent demonstration for me. But I should like you to summarize what you have already said on this subject and to postulate a general rule relating to the investigation of the existence of the substance intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories.

Master: You must know that the substance intermediary between the First Author and the substance supporting the categories is not one substance, but many. Now we can investigate in two ways the existence of those substances that are intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories. One of these ways is to consider the properties of the First Author and the properties of the substance that supports the categories; and it was according to this method that we established all the proofs that we have adduced up to this point. The second method is based on an investigation of the existence of the substances intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories according to the effects and actions of these substances and according to the emanation of their powers from each other. I call actions and effects of these substances the figures that appear in the substance that supports the categories and which it receives from the action on it of the simple substances, and the passions that, in each of the simple substances, are the effects of these substances upon each other. The difference in these methods consists in this, that the first leads us to the knowledge of the absolute existence of the substance intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories. The second method leads us to a knowledge of what the intermediary substance is, how it is, and why it is.

Pupil: I should like to be convinced of the truth of the proofs that we have established by the first method before we undertake to establish the proofs by the second method. And I ask you to remove the doubt that I have on this matter; for I know that all the terms of the propositions advanced in the proofs are defined, for it is necessary that there should be either genera, or species, or differences, or individuals, or properties or accidents; I know also none of these things applies to the First Author. How then can the proofs that you have adduced be true?

Master: Our intention in regard to the definition of the terms of the propositions advanced in the proofs was merely to know the terms, and now we have in some manner a knowledge of the First Author according to his properties, although he is not defined. Therefore there was no need for us, since we know something of him, to treat of the definition of the terms of the proposition adduced in the proofs in regard to him. But the definitions that are predicated from the terms of these proofs are taken either from the properties of the essence of the First Author, or from the effects that are attributed to him, or from the properties of those things that are inferior to him and that are not attributed to him. When we describe him by properties that are said to be his, what is achieved thus is an affirmative proposition. And when we take away from him some property not attributed to him, what is thus achieved is a negative proposition, and it will constitute in the proofs a true proposition.

If both propositions adduced in the syllogisms are theological, their affirmative and negative connection will depend on the affirmative and negative connection of the two terms of each of the propositions. And if one proposition is theological and the other not, their negative connection depends on the two terms of the negative theological premise — negative, I assert, that is by taking away from God the blessed, the non-divine property; and their connection cannot be affirmative, since it is impossible for God to be described by a non-theological property.

Pupil: What your words imply is that the propositions are of two kinds: divine and not divine. But I doubt whether the divine proof is a proof, since it contains neither genus nor species nor any of the logical terms.

Master: Since you are convinced of the connection of the terms of the theological propositions, although the case is not the same as in the case of the non-divine proposition, yet each of the propositions is similar to the other in order and arrangement, that is, in the position of the terms considered according to the rules of the logical figures.

It is therefore not inappropriate, it is even necessary, that it should be called a divine proof, since the non-divine proof is the conjunction of true propositions and their arrangement according to the rules of the logical figures, and the divine proof is similar to it. Also, the propositions adduced in the divine proof are either first or second. If they are first, then they will be equal to the first propositions that are adduced in the non-divine proof. If they are second, they must have been drawn from the source of the second propositions advanced in the non-divine proof; and since this is so, they are equal to them. Therefore the divine proof and the non-divine proof, in so far as their truth is involved, are equal. And since this is the case, it is not inadmissible, it is even necessary that the divine proof should be called a proof.

Pupil: Why did the one who said this say that in divine knowledge there is no proof?

Master: The one who said this, if he meant that in divine knowledge there is no proof whatever, was wrong. If he meant that in divine knowledge we do not use the non-divine proof that is composed of logical terms, he was right, and I do not contradict him.

Pupil: Now I know clearly the existence of the intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories according to the method of considering the properties of the First Author and the properties of the substance that supports the categories. This is evident to me from the proofs that you have presented according to this method. Thanks to them the doubt that I entertained is gone and it is now evident to me that they are true. Show me now the existence of the substance intermediary between the First Author and the substance that supports the categories, according to the effects and the results and according to the emanation.

Master: Do you consider it necessary or not to grant the actions of things upon each other?

Pupil: Why should I not grant it, when the evidence of the thing and due reflection demonstrate the existence of these actions? But I do not know what this action is, or why it is, or how it is.

Master: What the action is, is this, that a thing gives its form to another thing when both things are apt for this. Now as to how, there is either a conjunction without an intermediary, or a conjunction with an intermediary, or there is a change and diminution of the form of the agent; or, on the contrary, there is no diminution of the quality of the agent; or there is an impression of the power of the agent upon the passive thing beyond time; or there is an opinion or an imagination, like the action of a loved object on the lover. But as to why there is this action of things upon each other, this occurs through the sublime universal cause, because the power that is the author of all things and moves all things by itself operates as long as it finds something to receive its action.

Hence it is necessary that the universal form, made by this power, should also act by itself. It is therefore a maker and an agent. Similarly it is also necessary that the first universal matter should receive the action by itself. Now it is the property of the universals that their nature should be in their parts. And since the parts receive their nature from the essence of the universals, they also give it to themselves. It is therefore necessary that they should receive it from their universals. And it is consequently necessary that all forms should be active and all matters passive. In regard to the form, the argument is as follows: The universal form acts necessarily. Now whenever a universal thing acts necessarily, its parts act necessarily. Therefore the parts of the universal form act necessarily. The argument for matter is as follows: The universal matter receives the action of the form. Whenever a universal thing receives the action of the form, all its parts receive it also. Therefore all the parts of the universal matter receive the action of the form.

Pupil: Why is the universal form said to act necessarily?

Master: Because the First Author, sublime and holy, dispenses the abundance that he has with him, for all that exists flows from him. And since the First Author is the dispenser of the form that is with him, he does not prevent it from flowing out; he is therefore the source that maintains, envelops, and comprehends everything that is. Hence it is necessary that all substances should obey his action and imitate him in giving their forms and bestowing their energies, as long as they find a matter ready to receive them. Now by the emanation of substances is understood their motion and desire to communicate the action, wherein they imitate the First Author. But they differ in this according to their perfection and imperfection, for some of them flow beyond time, and others in time; and the different superior substances, in the emanation of their flow, are in relation to the inferior substances just as the First Author is to the superior and inferior substances in regard to his emanation over them, although their flow is different in each case. Similarly the superior substances are in relation to the First Author, in their passivity in regard to him, just like the inferior substances in relation to the superior substances in their passivity in regard to them. In short, the first emanation, that embraces all substances, makes it necessary that the substances emanate into others. And in this regard take an example from the sun that does not emanate by itself and does not communicate its rays except for the reason that it falls under the first emanation and obeys it.

When we study the cause of the emanation of substances from each other, we shall find still other causes for this phenomenon. One of these is that the form is more subtle than the matter. And since the subtle penetrates and traverses that which is before it and opposes it, it follows necessarily that the form penetrates and traverses all that is before it and opposes it.